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Journal of Geographical Sciences >

2025 , Vol. 35 >Issue 6: 1286 - 1310

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11442-025-2367-7

Research Articles

Land transaction trajectories of China’s overseas industrial parks in developing countries: Evidence from Southeast Asia

  • LI Dongxue , 1 ,
  • HU Qiao , 2, *
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  • 1. School of Architecture and Planning, Yunnan University, Kunming 650504, China
  • 2. School of Geo-Science & Technology, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450066, China
* Hu Qiao (1993-), Lecturer, specialized in urban geography. E-mail:

Li Dongxue (1991-), Lecturer, specialized in industrial park planning and urbanization in Southeast Asia. E-mail:

Received date: 2024-10-04

  Accepted date: 2025-04-11

  Online published: 2025-08-28

Supported by

Philosophy and Social Science Planning Projects in Yunnan Province(QN202428)

China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(2024M752918)

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Abstract

Foreign-funded overseas industrial parks (OIPs) are crucial for attracting foreign investment and promoting globalization in developing countries. However, large-scale land acquisition for these parks generates conflicts between developers and local stakeholders, increasing development costs. A qualitative multicase study was conducted in this study to analyze the land transaction trajectories of China’s OIPs. Four OIPs were selected to reveal the underlying mechanisms from the perspectives of institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, and enterprise heterogeneity. The findings indicate that in host countries with insufficient institutional development, local governments are more inclined to directly engage in OIP land acquisition. High-level intergovernmental mechanisms facilitate land acquisition processes, although their efficacy depends largely on administrative power allocation across parks in host countries. The results also indicate that enterprise characteristics significantly influence land acquisition, where microscale private enterprises lacking political connections often employ low-cost, bottom-up strategies by leveraging international experience. In summary, policy-makers in developing countries should prioritize enhancing OIP governance to mitigate transaction costs, promote diversified land supply, and optimize land allocation. By depicting China’s OIP land acquisition processes, this study deepens the academic understanding of OIP governance in developing countries and related international land transactions, offering practical OIP management insights for governments in both host and parent countries.

Key words： land transaction trajectories; institutional arrangements; governance mechanisms; enterprise heterogeneity; overseas industrial parks; developing countries

Cite this article

LI Dongxue , HU Qiao . Land transaction trajectories of China’s overseas industrial parks in developing countries: Evidence from Southeast Asia[J]. Journal of Geographical Sciences, 2025 , 35(6) : 1286 -1310 . DOI: 10.1007/s11442-025-2367-7

1 Introduction

International investment, recognized as an integral component of global engagement, is crucial for driving economic development in developing countries (Yu, 2024). Foreign-funded overseas industrial parks (OIPs) serve as vital platforms for foreign enterprises investing in developing countries, attracting subsequent investments by offering comprehensive infrastructure and public services. Enterprises from nations such as Japan, Singapore, and China have actively participated in the development and construction of foreign-funded OIPs in Asia and Africa (Perry and Yeoh, 2000; Brautigam and Tang, 2012; UNCTAD, 2017). Beginning in 2005, China initiated the construction of OIPs to promote overseas investment and leverage platform effects in Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East and certain developed countries. Owing to this early initiation, over 50 China’s OIPs are currently operating in Southeast Asia and demonstrate a relatively mature development trajectory. However, the development of these OIPs has been uneven (Goodfellow and Huang, 2022), primarily due to substantial land acquisition costs, institutional and societal challenges within host countries, and concerns regarding the parks’ economic sustainability.
As a greenfield investment model, OIP construction requires enterprises to establish their investments from scratch in host countries, rendering the investment costly and irreversible (Contractor et al., 2014). Land, as a long-term fixed asset, directly impacts the enterprise’s available financial flow and subsequent park operations during the initial OIP investment phases. Land acquisition initiates interactions between development enterprises and the local community. However, the absence of comprehensive land registration and verification systems in host countries results in ambiguous property rights and increased transaction costs for international land transactions (Shagaida, 2005; Deininger et al., 2014). Moreover, the substantial land demands of OIP development, coupled with a limited understanding of the local environment and the liability of foreignness, significantly increase the risk of land conflicts. No uniform pathway exists for Chinese enterprises to perform industrial land transactions in host countries. Industrial land use is critical to a nation’s industrial development, and industrial land tenure is typically dominated by the public sector in countries with public and private land ownership (Hu et al., 2019). Limited governmental control over land or ineffective land markets in host countries frequently results in protracted land acquisition negotiations between development enterprises and government or private entities. Consequently, development enterprises must actively pursue strategies to acquire land effectively to minimize the costs of information gathering, negotiation, and conflict resolution arising from land transactions.
Research on land transaction processes within China’s OIPs remains limited. Existing studies have focused primarily on the market-oriented nature of these parks. Unlike China’s domestically government-dominated industrial parks, its OIPs adopt a market-driven approach, originating primarily from competitive industries within China (Ye et al., 2020). Consequently, development enterprises must independently manage land-related decisions and assume full responsibility for the outcomes. These studies also investigate the interaction of China’s OIPs with the institutional and cultural contexts of host countries. The contextual differences between China and host countries present significant challenges to OIP development (Song et al., 2018; Liang et al., 2021). To ensure stable and sustainable growth, integration into the host country’s socioeconomic environment across political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions is crucial (Liang et al., 2021; Song et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2021, 2022; Meng et al., 2023; Liu and Wang, 2024). Efficient and pragmatic international governmental coordination mechanisms secure support from both host and Chinese governments (Liu et al., 2021) and mobilize additional resources to drive project implementation. Finally, research on the impact of China’s OIPs suggests their significant role in strengthening bilateral trade relations between China and host countries (Liu et al., 2024). Within host countries, these parks serve as hubs for enterprise clustering and industrial development, generating employment opportunities and improving local infrastructure and business environments (Zhao et al., 2020).
Research on foreign direct investment (FDI) in land in developing countries offers valuable insights for understanding land transactions involving China’s OIPs. The involvement of foreign enterprises in international land transactions has emerged as a prominent global phenomenon (UNCTAD, 2009; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Zagema, 2011); however, much of this research has focused on the negative impacts of FDI in land on the social welfare of host countries (Santangelo, 2018). Some studies have characterized this practice as land grabbing facilitated by government-enterprise cooperation (Cotula et al., 2009; Görgen et al., 2009; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). The increase in and evolution of these land transactions have become a primary source of land conflicts in developing countries (Platteau, 1996; Colin, 2013). When foreign enterprises enter these markets, host country governments often occupy conflicting roles. Local governments must position themselves within global competition to effectively leverage global capital flows while simultaneously fulfilling their responsibilities to local citizens (Weber, 2010; Zhao et al., 2024). Given that land transactions involve multiple local stakeholders, exploring these transactions from the perspectives of foreign investors, such as investment enterprises and parks, rather than solely from the perspectives of host country governments and residents, is valuable.
While existing research has examined diverse facets of China’s OIPs, including marketization, institutional embeddedness within host countries, and construction effectiveness, the critical role of land as a key asset has received limited scholarly attention. This neglect is related to the global lack of academic research on large-scale industrial land acquisition by foreign enterprises and the adaptability of various land acquisition methods to the context of the host country. Given the accelerating pace of industrialization in developing economies, the proliferation of foreign-funded OIPs, including Chinese-funded OIPs, is anticipated, resulting in a corresponding increase in land use rights transactions. Consequently, research on land transactions within China’s OIPs can contribute to addressing existing knowledge gaps in understanding both the governance of these parks and the specific modalities of FDI in land in developing countries.
This study addresses two central research questions: (1) How do development enterprises leverage institutional embeddedness in host countries to acquire large-scale industrial land? (2) How do development enterprises select appropriate land transaction trajectories based on their specific characteristics? To respond to these questions, this study constructs a theoretical framework for understanding land transaction activities within China’s OIPs from the perspectives of host country institutions and enterprise heterogeneity, informed by new institutional economics (NIE) theory. The study proposes three testable hypotheses. A multicase study methodology is adopted to develop a generalizable framework capable of capturing the complex microprocesses and specificities of land transactions between development enterprises and host countries. An examination of four China’s OIPs in Southeast Asia officially certified by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM), reveals prevalent land transaction patterns within these OIPs, thus enabling validation of the proposed hypotheses. The selected parks exhibit both shared and distinctive characteristics, facilitating the identification of land transaction patterns common across cases as well as those unique to individual cases.
This study aims to address the existing gap in research on China’s OIP governance. Given that land transactions for these parks are deeply embedded within the institutional environments of host countries, they significantly influence the parks’ sustainability and their relationships with local communities. By examining land transaction trajectories, this study enhances the understanding of the localized development of market-oriented China’s OIPs. Furthermore, it offers valuable microlevel insights into FDI in land within developing countries. As industrial parks require substantial industrial land, complex land transactions are inherent to their development. By incorporating diverse perspectives, including the institutional environment and corporate economic actions, this study provides both practical support and theoretical insights into overseas investments for policy-makers and businesses.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 New institutional economics (NIE)

NIE posits that institutions constitute significant constraints on economic activities, emphasizing the analysis of such activities within real-world contexts. Williamson (1996) delineated factors relevant to economic activities from three distinct perspectives, including the institutional environment, governance structures, and individual characteristics. Adaptation to the relevant institutions of host countries is essential for transaction decisions and for addressing legitimacy challenges within the land transaction process. Furthermore, NIE highlights the important role of bounded rationality in individual economic decision-making. Enterprises and entrepreneurs, as the primary actors in land transaction decisions, operate under constraints imposed by incomplete information, uncertain environments, and limited information processing capabilities (Simon, 2013). Consequently, the characteristics of both parties involved in a transaction can influence the land transaction pathways.
This study focuses on the interrelationship between institutions and enterprise heterogeneity. In addition to formal institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, including governmental management mechanisms and liabilities at various administrative levels, are also considered as institutional factors. This NIE framework informs the analysis of land transaction processes within China’s OIPs (Figure 1). The institutional environment in host countries represents the prevailing “rules of the game”, with development enterprises acting as the “players” (North, 1991; Scott, 2008). As “new entrants” into the host country’s institutional environment, these enterprises are strongly motivated to establish external legitimacy (Zaheer, 1995). However, the diverse microlevel characteristics of development enterprises inevitably lead to heterogeneous preferences in their land transaction decisions.
Figure 1 The influence mechanism of land acquisition in China’s overseas industrial parks (OIPs)
Transaction costs constitute a core principle within NIE. Building upon Coase’s theory of transaction costs, every transaction incurs costs related to information search, contract negotiation, and subsequent rent monitoring and execution (Coase, 1995). The transfer of land property rights is central to land transactions (Holtslag-Broekhof et al., 2014). From a property rights perspective, Barzel (1999) defines transaction costs as the expenditures incurred by stakeholders in resource allocation for the acquisition, transfer, and protection of these rights. Environmental and enterprise-related risks and uncertainties are key factors that increase transaction costs (Xie et al., 2019). As land is a critical element for China’s OIPs entering host countries, high land costs and constrained cognition capabilities can significantly impact the progress and outcomes of foreign-funded OIPs.
Institutions shape the relationships and interactions between landowners and buyers (Holtslag-Broekhof et al., 2014), fostering stable and predictable stakeholder relationships. Institutions can mitigate uncertainty by establishing trust, promoting coordination, and addressing knowledge gaps. Effective institutions guide individual decision-making in complex and uncertain environments, even without complete information. Consequently, transaction costs are significantly influenced by institutional quality (North, 1991). Ambiguous or overly rigid institutions tend to increase transaction costs. High institutional transaction costs may incentivize transaction parties to rely on informal constraints (North, 1991). While institutional arrangements and governance mechanisms establish stable land transaction frameworks, residual uncertainties within the transaction process can still lead to unpredictable human behavior (Xie et al., 2019).
The internal uncertainties inherent in transactions also contribute to increased transaction costs (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018). Decision-makers face limitations in computation and cognition within complex and uncertain environments. Asymmetric knowledge regarding transaction costs and information influences the final transaction decisions and prices (Kostov, 2010; Curtiss et al., 2013). According to the resource-based view (RBV), empirical operational knowledge is an important form of expertise accumulation for development enterprises. Investment activities reflect an enterprise’s motivation to exploit or explore resources (Barney, 1991). Familiarity with international operations or the market, customs, and communication in host countries enables enterprises to effectively reduce transaction costs and make more informed decisions during negotiations with local entities (Slangen and Hennart, 2008; Dikova et al., 2010). Moreover, enterprise characteristics, such as the ownership structure, political connections, and financial capabilities, shape the external incentives and internal attributes of development enterprises, thereby influencing their land transaction behavior.

2.2 Research hypotheses

This study proposes three hypotheses regarding land acquisition for China’s OIPs in Southeast Asia, considering institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, and enterprise heterogeneity.
Hypothesis 1: Weaker institutional arrangements within the host country increase the likelihood of local government intervention in OIP land acquisition.
A robust mechanism for property rights arrangements is essential for effective market transactions (Pennington, 1991). Foreign enterprises can efficiently utilize the land market for land acquisition only in countries with clear property rights allocation and information symmetry (Xie et al., 2019). In countries where property rights are ambiguous, land acquisition options for foreign enterprises are often restricted, resulting in increased transaction costs. This challenge manifests both in countries with highly centralized land property rights under public ownership and in those with highly fragmented land property rights under private ownership (Shagaida, 2005).
In countries lacking a solid tradable market for industrial land, host country governments often need to acquire substantial land areas to accommodate rapid industrialization (Larbi et al., 2004; Sargeson, 2016), particularly given that industrial parks frequently constitute major projects for both national and local governments. In countries with public land ownership, governments are the sole providers of land property rights. In these cases, governments often leverage their political authority to acquire land and subsequently sell it at prices significantly exceeding the initial compensation rate (Wan et al., 2021). Many Southeast Asian nations employ a top-down land concession mechanism, which leases land to domestic and foreign investors on a long-term basis. This mechanism effectively transforms land resources into government revenue, thereby making the transfer of land property rights a predominantly political process.
The uneven distribution of land value appreciation and compensation resulting from land expropriation frequently generates economic conflicts (Han and Vu, 2008; Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014). The land property rights systems in much of Southeast Asia are incomplete, and conflicts and even violence are not uncommon during the land rights allocation process (Hamilton-Hart, 2013). Land expropriation involves both local landholders and foreign investors. For foreign enterprises, this dual duality is a key factor contributing to tension and conflict during land transactions (Colin, 2013). Consequently, foreign enterprises may opt to cooperate with local governments in host countries to mitigate the increased transaction costs and uncertainties associated with institutional deficiencies (Witt, 2019).
Hypothesis 2: The administrative power distribution within host countries influences the implementation of land acquisition coordination mechanisms for OIPs.
While the decentralization of power in local authorities is a prevalent trend (Turner, 2006), unitary state systems remain dominant in Southeast Asia, albeit with varying degrees of decentralization. The administrative authority for OIP management is typically concentrated at the national level, with local authorities primarily providing support and coordination services. High levels of centralization within host countries can be advantageous for attracting attention to OIP projects, such as ensuring the mobilization of necessary resources for construction and facilitating direct connections between key businesses and the central government. Under such systems, local authorities are directly subordinate to the central government, fostering a high degree of alignment in their interests. However, local governments may exhibit passivity in fully executing their coordination and guidance roles due to limitations in administrative capacity and efficiency, potentially hindering effective OIP management (Adamcová and Ondrová, 2017). Furthermore, excessive power concentration within certain governments can create opportunities for corruption and thereby exacerbate these negative impacts (De Viteri Vázquez and Bjørnskov, 2020).
In countries with a higher degree of decentralization, local governments possess greater autonomy. Central government involvement in foreign-funded OIPs in these contexts tends to be driven by objectives such as promoting open trade and fostering transparent investment cooperation. By delegating a portion of the administrative authority to local levels, these systems provide local governments with stronger incentives to cultivate a more favorable business environment for China’s OIPs, including mobilizing resources, attracting investment, and facilitating cooperative operations (Dufhues et al., 2015). Given their direct accountability to the local population, local political actors are typically more proactive than are their central government counterparts in leveraging local resources (Bardhan, 2002). Expanding government functions through integration with economic domains encourages local authorities to forge growth alliances with enterprises (Molotch, 1976; Lake, 1990). Such politically led growth alliances can ensure parallel economic development for both OIPs and the surrounding urban areas.
Hypothesis 3: Development enterprises with weaker comprehensive capabilities tend to adopt bottom-up localized strategies in land acquisitions.
Development enterprises exhibit heterogeneous characteristics with respect to political resources, international experience, and enterprise scale, resulting in internally biased preferences. This heterogeneity, combined with varying levels of advantages in transaction costs and information access, significantly influences transaction decisions (Kostov, 2010; Curtiss et al., 2013).
The ownership structure and political affiliations of development enterprises influence their funding sources, value orientations, and how they are perceived by host countries during the land acquisition process. China’s state-owned enterprises benefit from ownership advantages, such as access to low-interest loans (Buckley et al., 2009) and soft budget constraints. These enterprises can mitigate risk by leveraging national credit or political resources (Li and Liang, 2012), thereby securing greater financial guarantees and increasing the likelihood of successful land transactions (Aw and Lee, 2008). Some private enterprises employ managers with political backgrounds to establish or maintain political connections and access resources and opportunities (Sun et al., 2012). The land transaction decisions of these enterprises may be influenced by “non-market motivations”, such as personal “political advancement”, and thus may not always prioritize the maximization of economic benefits. However, stakeholders in host countries may scrutinize these enterprises’ non-market intentions, potentially increasing transaction costs. Consequently, state-owned enterprises and politically affiliated enterprises tend to adhere to more formal decision-making processes, whereas private enterprises, bearing fewer perceived “political burdens”, can exhibit greater flexibility in their decision-making (Chen et al., 2015).
Empirical skills reflect the aggregated knowledge of development enterprises in international operations and influence their transaction decision-making (Das and Teng, 2000). Development enterprises often face challenges in managing risks due to limited knowledge of host country market opportunities and the specific risks associated with land transactions and operations. Concurrently, local residents may exhibit biases against foreign enterprises (Zaheer, 1995). These challenges collectively affect the land acquisition process. However, empirical experience on international operations can effectively mitigate the negative consequences of information asymmetry on land transaction decisions (Klier et al., 2017).
Owing to incomplete institutional arrangements, insufficient political and financial support in many host countries, and inadequate institutional designs from parent countries, many development enterprises do not consistently adhere to formal institutional procedures when resolving transaction issues. In particular, microscale private enterprises often favor bottom-up approaches to minimize costs (Meyer and Thein, 2014), such as emphasizing social responsibility initiatives and accepting lower ownership stakes. This preference stems from their limited financial and political resources, coupled with the need for substantial asset accumulation during the initial development phase. The specific strategies adopted typically depend on the particular characteristics of the OIP and the enterprise’s accumulated empirical experience.

3 Methodology and case studies

This study examines the land transaction issues of China’s OIPs in developing countries through a multicase study. Four China’s OIPs were selected for examination, with basic case information shown in Table 1 and Figure 2. The analysis proceeds by first describing the background and process of land acquisition in each case based on data from field surveys, relevant policy documents, and planning texts. The hypotheses proposed in Section 2.2 are subsequently examined in relation to these cases under the theoretical framework proposed in Section 2.1. The selection of four cases adheres to the principles of multicase study research advocated by Eisenhardt (1989), which states that comparisons of 4-10 cases are typically necessary to ensure the generalizability of research findings. Examining individual cases allows for the identification of unique patterns, while cross-case comparison facilitates the validation of common patterns (Gerring, 2006).
Table 1 Overview of the cases
Name SSEZ SCDZ TCRIZ LJIP
Host country Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam
Established year 2007 2011 2006 2007
Area (km2) 11.13 11.50 20.00 6.00
Ownership of developer Private enterprise State-owned enterprise Private enterprise Private enterprise
Relationship with local park Independent park Independent park Subsidiary park Subsidiary park (The relying park has not yet been built)
Leading industry Textile and apparel, luggage and leather goods, wood products, hardware machinery, building materials and home furnishings, fine chemicals Electronic products, energy and chemical industry, headquarters economy, agricultural product processing, commerce and trade services, warehousing and logistics, textile processing, biopharmaceuticals, health and wellness industry Automotive parts, machinery, building materials, home appliances, electronics Electronic and cooling equipment, mechanical assembly, wood products, household goods and appliances, rubber and plastic products, medical drugs and equipment, agricultural and forestry products
Number of enterprises in the OIP 170 108 170 48
Cumulative
employment		 About 30,000 About 10,000 About 45,000 About 25,000
Figure 2 Location of some China’s overseas industrial parks
In addition, case selection adheres to the principle of “replication logic” in multicase analyses (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), ensuring both representativeness and comparability. All four OIPs are MOFCOM-certified and have been established for over ten years, successfully attracting international attention. This successful operation ensures strong representativeness. Furthermore, while all the cases are located in Southeast Asian countries, they exhibit variations in host country institutional mechanisms and enterprise characteristics, thereby enabling effective cross-case validation. The land and management systems in host countries related to the OIPs of the Thai-Chinese Rayong Industrial Zone (TCRIZ) and Long Jiang Industrial Park (LJIP) are relatively mature, whereas those of the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and Saysettha Comprehensive Development Zone (SCDZ) are still in the exploratory phase. The two mature cases fulfill the criteria of literal replication, whereas the other two cases follow the principle of theoretical replication.
For each case, data were collected through in-depth interviews, field observations, and secondary data analysis, thus adhering to the principle of triangulation (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). Semistructured interviews were conducted with managers in each park. Between 2018 and 2023, more than 40 personnel from the parks were interviewed, including current and former park, project, and enterprise managers, investment promotion and park planning staff, and local partners (Table 2). The interviews with local partners were facilitated by local translators. The interviews with park personnel typically lasted 30-60 minutes, while those with enterprise representatives lasted 20-30 minutes. All the interviews were recorded with the informed consent of all the participants. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews were conducted both on site and online. Furthermore, onsite field surveys were conducted in each park to observe interactions between the parks and local communities and to understand the processes and outcomes of park development and localization. Four field surveys were conducted, with observational data collected through field notes, videos, and photographs. Finally, secondary data, including policies, plans, and basic park information from websites and media reports in host countries, as well as park planning documents obtained from park management or planning institutes, were collected from online sources.
Table 2 Introduction to the interviews
OIP Interviewee Interview content Duration
(h)		 Code
SSEZ Managers of development company (3) Developmental Journey of the OIP
Land transactions of the OIP		 3 KH1-KH3
Managers of enterprises in the OIP (3) Localization of enterprises 1.5 KH4-KH6
Officials from Sihanoukville province government (2) Industrial park-related policies 2 KH7-KH8
Managers of planning and design institution (1) Planning of the OIP 1 KH9
SCDZ Managers of development company (3) Developmental Journey of the OIP
Land transactions of the OIP		 3 LA1-LA3
Staff of development company (3) Process of land transactions of the OIP 1.5 LA4-LA6
Managers of operation management company (1) Operation coordination of the OIP 1 LA7
Managers of enterprises in the OIP (4) Localization of enterprises 2 LA8-LA11
Managers of planning and design institution (2) Planning of the OIP 2 LA12-LA13
Leadership of the Guangdong Chamber of Commerce in Laos (1) Industrial park-related policies 0.5 LA14
Officials from the Special Economic Zone
administrative authority (2)		 Industrial park-related policies 2 LA15-LA16
TCRIZ Local industrial city staff (3) Positioning of the OIP 1.5 TH1-TH3
Managers of development company (5) Developmental Journey of the OIP
Land transactions of the OIP		 3 TH4-TH8
Managers of enterprises in the OIP (3) Localization of enterprises 1.5 TH9-TH11
Officials from the Board of Investment (2) Industrial park related policies 2 TH12-TH13
LJIP Managers of development company (2) Developmental Journey of the OIP
Land transactions of the OIP
Planning of the OIP		 2 VN1-VN2
Leadership of the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce in Vietnam (4)		 Industrial park related policies 2 VN3-VN6
Through rigorous data comparison, classification, and analysis, the complexities of land acquisition in China’s OIPs were elucidated via the extensive qualitative data collected. Representative datasets were identified and extracted from the raw data, with selected raw data referenced to enrich the in-depth analyses. A three-stage coding process was subsequently applied to these data, iteratively refining the core themes to facilitate a clearer understanding of the roles of institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, and enterprise heterogeneity in shaping land acquisition trajectories within China’s OIPs.

4 Typical cases

Land acquisition within the four selected China’s OIPs involves a range of stakeholders and complex negotiation processes. This section provides descriptions of the profiles and land acquisition processes of each park, thus establishing a foundation for subsequent cross-case analysis.

4.1 Saysettha Comprehensive Development Zone (SCDZ)

Background: The SCDZ in Laos, officially established in 2011, is the sole national-level collaborative OIP between China and Laos. This OIP is jointly invested in and managed by the Lao Vientiane municipal government and a Chinese state-owned enterprise, Yunnan Construction and Investment Holdings Group Co., Ltd. (YCIH). The park is located northeast of Vientiane, approximately 5 km from the Vientiane railway station, and encompasses the Xaithany and Xaisettha districts. In 2012, Laos signed a development agreement with China, committing to facilitating land acquisition and relocation through relevant departments and providing external infrastructure construction support.
Land Acquisition Process: The land within the SCDZ is state owned and was acquired from local authorities through funding for other government projects. YCIH, a construction enterprise, undertook this OIP investment in Laos, which represented an expansion beyond its initial planned activities. In 2006, YCIH had constructed the venue for the 25th Southeast Asian Games in Laos. The 10 km2 of land for the SCDZ was offered by the Lao government as an offset for debts incurred from the venue project, and it was designated for joint development by the Vientiane municipal government and YCIH. The municipal government presented two land options: Plan A, which involved land in central Vientiane designated for commercial real estate development, and Plan B, which involved land northeast of Vientiane for comprehensive development. Plan B was ultimately selected (Figure 3a). YCIH and the municipal government jointly manage the park through the Lao-China Joint Venture Investment Co., Ltd. (LCC). The Vientiane municipality secured a 25% stake after compensating for the project debts with land, while YCIH secured a 75% stake funded by the China Development Bank. Additionally, Laos appointed a deputy manager at the SCDZ with dual supervisory and advisory responsibilities, who actively participates in park development and construction.
Figure 3 Site selection scheme and land acquisition phases of OIPs (a. Reproduced from the Land Categorization in the Core Urban Area diagram in the Vientiane Capital Urban Development Master Plan; b. Reproduced from the planning map in the SCDZ control detailed plan)
The park is situated within the 21-km industrial zone of Vientiane city’s subcenter. As the majority of the land within the SCDZ consisted of forests and farmlands with few residential areas, the land expropriation process was relatively straightforward. This process comprised three distinct phases (Figure 3b). The first two phases involved direct negotiations between local residents and the municipal government to establish compensation standards. Following payment, land use rights were transferred from private ownership to state ownership and then to the LCC. The LCC initially obtained land use rights for a period of 50 years and subsequently extended that period to 99 years. Phase one, covering 4 km2, was completed between 2011 and 2015. Phase two, encompassing 6 km2 and involving 176 households, was completed between 2016 and 2020. With the commencement of park operations during the second phase, land values in the surrounding areas began to rise significantly, resulting in expropriation costs nearly doubling compared with those in phase one. The third phase, initiated in 2021 in response to requests from the LCC, covered 150.96 ha. This land was purchased from local residents and designated as reserved park land, with certification provided by municipal departments.

4.2 Long Jiang Industrial Park (LJIP)

Background: The LJIP, officially established in 2007, is Vietnam’s first exclusively China’s OIP and was developed by the Chinese private enterprise Qianjiang Investment Management Co., Ltd. (QJIM). With a total investment of US$ 105 million, the park is located in Tan Phuoc District, Tien Giang Province, along the Ho Chi Minh City‒Trung Luong Highway, approximately 50 km from the center of Ho Chi Minh City. The park comprises a 540-ha industrial area and a 60-ha residential service area. In 2011, the OIP project was certified by the MOFCOM, becoming an officially recognized national-level China’s OIP.
Land Acquisition Process: Land acquisition by the LJIP was dominated by the Chinese enterprise. The enterprise leased land from the Vietnamese government and independently handled land expropriation and compensation for local residents. The Vietnamese Prime Minister approved the establishment of the industrial park for a 50-year operational period and included it within Vietnam’s 2006-2015 priority industrial park planning framework. The LJIP operates under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) model, with the development enterprise securing a concession from Tien Giang Province. Funding for the project was derived from a combination of self-owned capital, loans, and external financing. Upon completion of the 50-year concession period, operational rights will be transferred to Tien Giang Province.
After obtaining the land expropriation permit and making a one-time payment for land expropriation, QJIM assumed responsibility for the expropriation process. However, the enterprise encountered challenges from local residents during land acquisition, leading to deviations from the park's original plans. The main entrance, initially planned for the northeast area, was relocated to the northwest. Similarly, the intended industrial land use in the southern section was changed to service use. Consequently, the initial park plan from 2007, despite being submitted to the Vietnamese Ministry of Construction, was revised in 2015 to accommodate these land expropriation constraints.
The implementation of the 2015 plan’s branch road construction also faced obstacles. To expedite the land acquisition process for the park, the development enterprise proactively made concessions to local residents, withdrawing the park’s main road by 100–200 m to create a buffer and shared area (Figure 4). The land use rights in the area surrounding the park were allocated to neighboring residents for commercial and residential purposes. Consequently, residents established a commercial street within this buffer and shared area, which increased the surrounding land values from US$ 2/m2 to US$ 100/m2. Related commercial and residential rental activities now provide residents with monthly incomes ranging from US$ 4000 to US$ 5000 and offer dining and lodging services to park employees.
Figure 4 The buffer and shared area between LJIP and neighboring residents

4.3 Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)

Background: The SSEZ is a China’s OIP in Cambodia, which was developed primarily by a Chinese private enterprise, the Hongdou Group, in collaboration with multiple Chinese and Cambodian companies. With a total investment of US$ 320 million, the SSEZ is located in Prey Nop District, Sihanouk Province, Cambodia, approximately 17 km from Sihanoukville city. This park represents China’s first national-level OIP to secure a bilateral government agreement and establish a joint government coordination mechanism. The SSEZ has garnered significant attention and support from both Chinese and Cambodian government authorities. Although initiated by private enterprises, the SSEZ reflects a top-down overseas investment initiative resulting from bilateral national-level cooperation between China and Cambodia.
Land Acquisition Process: Land acquisition in the SSEZ exemplifies the process by which Chinese development enterprises lease land from private landowners. The SSEZ was among the first group of China’s OIPs successfully certified by the MOFCOM, with an initial planned area of 11 km2. In 2006, three development enterprises from Wuxi city conducted field surveys in Cambodia to assess the feasibility of establishing an OIP, which coincided with the MOFCOM’s launch of the first round of bidding for China’s OIPs. These three enterprises were the initial successful bidders and formed a joint venture with a Cambodian company. However, disagreements among the Chinese partners regarding the OIP development strategy led to project restructuring in 2007. The Hongdou Group subsequently assumed control of the SSEZ project, acquiring 70% of the Chinese shares and taking a leading role in the park’s construction. The Hongdou Group, which operates a large industrial park in Wuxi city, possesses substantial financial resources. To increase operational efficiency, the Hongdou Group assumed full responsibility for all aspects of the SSEZ project.
Owing to the significant differences between the Cambodian and Chinese land systems, the development enterprises encountered challenges in advancing the park’s construction during the initial phase because of their limited familiarity with host country practices. The SSEZ development enterprise directly negotiated and purchased land from private landowners after securing the necessary government permits. The park zone encompassed more than 300 landowners and was characterized by dense shrubbery and a 70-m elevation difference. In 2007, the Hongdou Group deployed a six-member negotiation team to engage with each landowner. Local landowners exhibited distrust of GPS surveying instruments, often requiring repeated measurements, which significantly protracted the land acquisition process. Acquiring the first parcel of land took three to four months, and securing a 70-year land use right certificate required a full year.

4.4 Thai-Chinese Rayong Industrial Zone (TCRIZ)

Background: The TCRIZ was established in 2006 through a collaboration between the Chinese private enterprise Holley Group and the local industrial real estate enterprise Amata Group. The park is located within the Amata city Rayong Industrial Estate in Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor, encompassing 12 km2. The Holley Group initiated its international business strategy in 2000, with Thailand as its initial focus. Based on the need for self-built factory space, the group decided to expand its business operations in the Thai market after achieving stable operations. Leveraging its existing expertise in overseas investment and production, the group initiated the OIP development project.
Land Acquisition Process: The land for the TCRIZ was acquired through shared ownership with the Amata Group. The Chinese Holley Group opted for collaboration with this established Thai industrial real estate company to reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations and facilitate effective communication with local residents and the host country government. Established in 1996, the Amata Group holds a significant position within the Thai industrial sector, with its two industrial estates accounting for 11% of Thailand’s total industrial output, thereby demonstrating substantial capital and political resources. In July 2005, the chairpersons of the Holley Group and the Amata Group signed memorandums of understanding to jointly establish the OIP. As a stockholder of TCRIA, the Holley Group directly participates in OIP establishment. The two enterprises formed a joint venture, the Thai-Chinese Rayong Industrial Realty Development Co., Ltd., with the Holley Group holding a 49% stake and the Amata Group holding a 51% stake.
The Holley Group and the Amata Group established a clear division of responsibilities: the Holley Group assumed responsibility for company operations and attracting investments, whereas the Amata Group focused on land acquisition and cooperation with local government entities. Having acquired the land through prior transactions with private landowners, the Amata City Rayong Industrial Estate holds legal ownership rights over the land through contractual agreements with Thailand’s Industrial Estate Authority (IEAT). The initial phase of the TCRIZ was established on land already secured within the Amata City Rayong Industrial Estate, thereby obviating the need for direct negotiation between the Holley Group and private landowners. Planning for Phases Two and Three was synchronized with ongoing land acquisition efforts. Through this strong collaboration with a local enterprise, the TCRIZ successfully attracted investments within a year of its establishment, effectively reducing startup costs and shortening investment cycles while facilitating the sharing of benefits and risks with local stakeholders. Subsequent land acquisition efforts proceeded smoothly.

5 Comparison of land transaction trajectories

Based on the examination of these four China’s OIPs, land acquisition involves three primary local entities: host country governments, local industrial real estate enterprises, and private landowners. Acquisition was achieved through three main land supply approaches: leasing, land concessions, and shareholding (Table 3). The ultimate transaction pathways are typically shaped by the interplay of institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, and enterprise heterogeneity within the host country context.
Table 3 Land transaction characteristics of the cases
Property right SSEZ SCDZ TCRIZ LJIP
Land property right Supply entity Private landowner Government Local industrial real estate company Government
Supply pathway Long-term land lease Land valuation as a capital contribution Land valuation as a capital contribution Land concession
land expropriation entity Development
enterprise		 Government and development
enterprise		 Land valuation as a capital contribution Development enterprise
Land property right type Land use right Land use right Land ownership Land use right
Land property right duration 70 years 99 years Permanent 50 years
Land income distribution Profit distribution entity Hongdou Group, other Chinese and Cambodian
enterprises		 YCIH, Vientiane Municipal
Government		 Holley Group,
Amata Group		 QJIM
Profit distribution ratio (China: host countries) 85%∶15% 75%∶25% 49%∶51% 100%∶0

5.1 Institutional arrangement

Variations in host country land systems determine the different land supply entities involved in an OIP. In Vietnam and Laos, state-owned land is typically leased or conceded to foreign investors. Therefore, land supply depends on different levels of government, with land acquisition completed by governmental entities or the development enterprises themselves.
In Cambodia and Thailand, the majority of OIP land was obtained from private landowners, resulting in a more dispersed land supply and more complex land transaction procedures. A key distinction lies in the fact that the industrial real estate market in Thailand is more developed, which allows local enterprises to resell land with clearly defined property rights to foreign developers and provides assistance with local procedures. Conversely, Cambodia’s less developed land market offers fewer transaction options for foreign developers. Consequently, the security of land property rights in these countries is comparatively weaker, often compelling OIP developers to purchase land directly from private entities, which leads to higher transaction costs.
The allocation of land rights to foreign investors can be categorized into two primary approaches (Table 4). A top-down approach, prevalent in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, establishes specific mechanisms for land concessions and leasing to promote economic development. Land concessions are particularly common in Laos and Cambodia and have been observed on a large scale with rapid growth (Messerli et al., 2015; Hett et al., 2020). Land nationalization forms the basis of land policies in Laos, which has a less developed land market economy. Government intervention in land allocation is frequent, serving specific governmental goals and interests, which constrains property rights within a politically dominated market rather than one driven primarily by economic forces. In contrast, Thailand adopts a more market-oriented approach, encouraging foreign investment through the transfer and leasing of land ownership without granting concession rights. Consequently, with the exception of the TCRIZ, governments in the other three cases were directly or indirectly involved in the land transaction process through direct land supply or the granting of concessions.
Table 4 Land tenure system in the host countries. The security of property rights relies on ranking countries’ property registration in the World Bank’s “Doing Business”, incorporating indicators covering legal and practical security dimensions.
Item Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam
Land ownership Private ownership dominance Public ownership dominance Private ownership dominance Public ownership dominance
Approaches to supplying land for IPs Land concession and land lease Land concession and land lease Land ownership transfer and land leasing Land concession and land lease
Property rights security (ranking) 124 85 66 60
The varying stages of industrial park development across different countries influenced the level of government intervention in industrial land transactions (Figure 5). OIP projects in Cambodia and Laos were established relatively recently, resulting in less developed institutional frameworks. Given that China’s OIPs generate spillover effects in technology and knowledge transfer (Meyer and Sinani, 2009), thus offering opportunities for local capacity building in park management, local governments in these countries actively participate in park establishment, development, and construction (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999). Furthermore, local governments are motivated by the potential for mutual benefit, with governments or state-owned enterprises often holding equity stakes in OIP projects, thereby sharing the profits generated from increased land value with Chinese development enterprises. In the case of the SCDZ, the Vientiane Municipal Government is not only responsible for land acquisition but also deeply involved in park planning and operations. While the local government in Cambodia does not hold a direct equity stake in the SSEZ, the local partner maintains close ties with Cambodian political parties.
Figure 5 The industrial park development trajectories in host countries
Industrial park development in Thailand and Vietnam has reached a higher level of maturity due to earlier initiation. Thailand has established a fully market-oriented system driven by enterprise demand, where there is no fundamental distinction between private industrial parks and ordinary profit-driven land development projects (Aveline-Dubach, 2010). In Vietnam, industrial parks have evolved into a stage of parallel development driven by both the government and private enterprises. Consequently, land transactions between the TCRIZ and local industrial real estate companies are entirely market-based. While land transactions for the LJIP in Vietnam are managed by the government within a state-owned land framework, the government does not participate in the distribution of profits derived from land value appreciation. This observation provides support for Hypothesis 1.
In countries such as Laos and Cambodia, where institutional development is incomplete and land property rights are relatively insecure, active engagement and the ability to share interests with host country entities can be advantageous for Chinese development enterprises. Such involvement helps mitigate risks, streamline political procedures, and, importantly, reduce transaction costs associated with information gathering and negotiation. While governments in countries such as Vietnam and Thailand do not directly receive a portion of the financial gains of China’s OIPs (Figure 6), stable institutional environment support from the host country remains crucial for successful OIP operations.
Figure 6 The system of host country and government intervention in land acquisition

5.2 Governance mechanism

When China’s OIPs achieve sufficient political prominence in host countries, bilateral government-to-government coordination mechanisms are typically established. These high-level governance mechanisms ensure increased support from host countries, facilitating resource mobilization (Liu et al., 2021) and reducing transaction costs during land rights transitions. Figure 7 illustrates the management frameworks of the four OIPs. In the SSEZ and the SCDZ, Chinese and host country governments established such bilateral government coordination mechanisms. These intergovernmental committees are responsible for addressing key issues related to park construction and operation, including land acquisition and resettlement. This responsibility explains why the Hongdou Group, the primary developer of the SSEZ, opted for independent land acquisition through negotiation, given the less developed land market and the prevalence of private land ownership in Cambodia. In contrast, for the TCRIZ in Thailand and the LJIP in Vietnam, both the Chinese and host country governments generally addressed OIP matters without establishing specific political support or commitments related to land acquisition.
Figure 7 The management structure of the cases
The distribution of administrative power and enforcement capabilities across different levels of government determines the extent of assistance that OIPs receive from host countries during land acquisition. Figure 8 outlines the governance mechanisms of OIPs in the four host countries. Since the early 1990s, Vietnam has progressively decentralized administrative powers to lower levels of government, including the management of FDI. This redis-tribution of industrial park-related authority in Vietnam involves both the national and local levels. The central government provides national-level guidance and coordination for industrial park development, focusing on macrolevel decision-making, and local governments support and supervise industrial park activities. Consequently, in Vietnam, the LJIP leased land directly from Tien Giang Province, with the Tien Giang Province Industrial Park Management Committee providing services and management for subsequent construction and operation. OIP-related issues can often be effectively resolved because of these mature local-level management mechanisms. Similarly, Laos has actively promoted the decentralization of SEZ management. In 2016, Laos transferred the supervision and management authority of SEZs from the Lao National Committee for SEZs to the SEZ Promotion and Management Office under the Ministry of Planning and Investment. Concurrently, Laos dissolved individual SEZ management institutions and established unified provincial-level SEZ management institutions. As an intergovernmental project in Laos, the SCDZ benefits from substantial support from the Lao central government, with the Vientiane municipal Government also providing coordination, support, and facilitating land acquisition.
Figure 8 The governance mechanisms of OIP in host countries
Thailand and Cambodia maintain relatively more centralized management mechanisms for industrial park governance. In Thailand, industrial parks are managed either by the IEAT within the Ministry of Industry or by local governments. However, local governments often face limitations in terms of financial and material resources, which can impede industrial park growth. Most of China’s OIPs in Thailand are managed by the IEAT, which provides one-stop services for development enterprises. The Amata Group, the local partner of the TCRIZ, is responsible for negotiating with the IEAT and facilitating communication. Cambodia has established distinct top-down frameworks for policy formulation and implementation related to SEZ management. The Cambodia Development Council (CDC) is the ultimate decision-making authority for SEZs, with limited opportunities for local government involvement in management or SEZ-related issues. Consequently, land acquisition for the SSEZ was coordinated by the Cambodian central government. Provincial governments are required to implement central policies and assist development enterprises in addressing operational issues within parks. However, provincial governments often lack sufficient enforcement capacity and struggle to establish effective coordination mechanisms and thus frequently require Chinese development enterprises to independently manage practical matters. These findings support Hypothesis 2.

5.3 Enterprise heterogeneity

State ownership or strong political connections of development enterprises facilitate the land acquisition process for OIPs by leveraging political capital from their home countries. YCIH, the Chinese development enterprise responsible for the SCDZ, is a state-owned enterprise. Similarly, while the primary developer of the SSEZ is a private company, its leadership maintains strong political connections, thus enabling engagement in local political affairs. The leadership committee includes individuals with experience as congress members or in similar political roles. Benefiting from established intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, both OIPs received substantial support and attention from local governments, reducing land acquisition costs through streamlined negotiation and supervision. In contrast, the development enterprises responsible for the TCRIZ and the LJIP pursued land acquisition through cost-effective, bottom-up approaches since they are private companies. The TCRIZ leveraged local enterprises as intermediaries for land acquisition. Owing to financial constraints, the LJIP adopted a “localization” strategy, facilitating land transactions by establishing buffers and shared areas through negotiations with local residents.
The varying degrees of international experience among development enterprises shape the diverse knowledge and expertise available to these companies and their entrepreneurs. The development enterprises responsible for the SCDZ and the SSEZ possess 27 and zero years of international experience, respectively (Figure 9). However, YCIH, the development enterprise behind the SCDZ, is primarily a construction company with limited experience in OIP investment. Consequently, both OIP projects received substantial government support. The SSEZ encountered challenges during land acquisition because of insufficient international experience and preparedness. Similarly, the SCDZ opted to collaborate with the China Merchants Group, an entity with expertise in OIP construction, to mitigate its own lack of experience in this specific domain.
Figure 9 International experience of development enterprises before the establishment of OIPs
Private enterprises initiating China’s OIP investments typically base their decisions on market forecasts and familiarity with host country policies. The development enterprises responsible for both the TCRIZ and LJIP possess seven years of experience in overseas investment projects (Figure 9). Prior to establishing the TCRIZ, the Holley Group had accumulated substantial experience in factory leasing and land acquisition within the host country. Furthermore, it mitigated investment costs by forming a partnership with a local enterprise, the Amata Group. Similarly, the development enterprise behind the LJIP leveraged its extensive international investment experience in Vietnam to become involved in, oversee, and operate OIPs, including establishing local networks and recruiting international personnel with extensive management expertise. This evidence supports Hypothesis 3, which posits that substantial international experience is crucial for successful OIP operations.

6 Conclusions

FDI serves as a critical catalyst for developing countries seeking to implement land capitalization strategies. This study examines the large-scale land acquisition activities of Chinese development enterprises in developing countries, focusing on four China’s OIPs in Southeast Asia. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between development enterprise decision-making and the diverse institutional frameworks of host countries. Drawing on NIE theory, this study conceptualizes land acquisition trajectories from three perspectives related to the context of the host country: institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, and enterprise heterogeneity. These findings help bridge the knowledge gap regarding industrial land transactions involving foreign companies in developing countries and can assist developing countries in optimizing their globalization strategies and improving their business environments.
The maturity of institutions in the host country influences the level of government involvement in the land acquisition process of China’s OIPs. Industrial land is a vital resource for economic development. In countries with less developed institutional frameworks, the land supply for OIPs tends to be politicized. Local governments are strongly motivated to oversee industrial land allocation, pursue indirect benefits from technology and knowledge transfer, and obtain a portion of the revenues generated from land transactions. Incomplete institutional arrangements in host countries introduce uncertainty and risk for foreign enterprises, which proactively adapt to these varying institutional contexts to minimize transaction costs. Engaging in land transactions and subsequent collaborations with local entities creates opportunities for government intervention.
Institutional implementation reflects the complex institutional environments prevalent in developing countries. While high-level intergovernmental governance mechanisms can facilitate land acquisition by China’s OIPs, the extent of support received from host countries remains variable. Centralized administrative power within the host country enhances the significance of OIP-related resource allocation and transaction procedures but can simultaneously constrain the policy implementation capacities of local governments. In such cases, some foreign-funded OIPs may opt to collaborate with local industrial real estate enterprises to comanage park operations. Conversely, OIPs can receive more substantial support from local governments in the land acquisition process when administrative power in host countries is decentralized to regional authorities.
Enterprise heterogeneity within host countries also influences decision-making regarding land acquisition by China’s OIPs. Political and economic support from parent countries reduces negotiation and supervision costs during land acquisition, a phenomenon commonly observed with state-owned enterprises or enterprises possessing strong political connections. Private enterprises, often constrained by financial and material resources, tend to adopt cost-effective, bottom-up strategies in land acquisition, including actively seeking assistance and cooperation from local enterprises and residents. Consistent with RBV theory, heterogeneity in enterprise resources influences land acquisition decisions. Enterprises with prior international experience possess greater familiarity with global operations and a more nuanced understanding of specific market characteristics in host countries. These advantages facilitate the implementation of bottom-up land acquisition strategies.
The findings of this study address a scholarly gap concerning land transactions and enterprise economic activities within the context of developing countries. First, by focusing on land transactions by China’s OIPs, this study complements existing research on FDI in land in developing economies. Industrial parks are crucial platforms for stimulating economic activity and attracting FDI in both developed and developing countries, with industrial land serving as a critical resource. The establishment of OIPs involves large-scale land transactions that significantly impact local governments and residents, thereby increasing the complexity of both land transactions and governance. Second, this study broadens the academic scope to encompass enterprise economic actions, particularly legal economic activities, within the context of cross-border embeddedness. The findings reveal how development enterprises manage their relationships with host countries, including navigating institutional arrangements and governance mechanisms, and how they make land transaction decisions that align with their specific characteristics and objectives. Third, by investigating the land acquisition process in China’s OIPs in Southeast Asia, this study offers empirical insights into OIP governance in developing economies. Land acquisition processes in these OIPs demonstrate significant adaptability to the institutional and governance contexts of host countries. In contrast to the conventional top-down industrial park development model often observed in China (Ye et al., 2020), these findings suggest that OIPs exhibit market-oriented operational characteristics and underscore the crucial role of a favorable business environment for OIP development in host countries.
The findings of this study offer valuable insights for OIP development and land transaction policies in developing countries. First, given the key role of local governments in OIP management, enhancing coordination and service capabilities for OIP development across various administrative levels can reduce costs for foreign development enterprises. Second, as industrialization progresses, developing countries should diversify land supply modes progressively, expanding the range of supplying entities and available acquisition avenues. This approach can effectively mitigate land conflict issues arising from “growth coalitions” in urban development, provide foreign development enterprises with a wider range of options, and enhance the efficiency of land resource allocation.
This study has a few limitations. While the analysis of four representative cases from Southeast Asia yielded extensive observations and interviews in relation to these OIPs, the full spectrum of possible land transaction patterns may not have been captured and warrants further exploration in future research. Additionally, owing to the limited availability of OIP data in the socioeconomic domain, the effectiveness of the observed land transaction patterns has not been fully analyzed. Gathering such data would enable a more comprehensive analysis of these patterns. Furthermore, conducting in-depth interviews with a broader range of local stakeholders beyond development enterprises would contribute to a more complete understanding of land transaction trajectories within China’s OIPs, offering more robust practical guidance for both developing countries and foreign-funded OIPs.

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