Figure 1 shows the changes in the number, length, landing points and landing countries of global submarine cables from 1995 to 2023. It can be seen that in the past 30 years, global submarine cables have experienced swift development. The number and total length of submarine cables with transnational attribute have increased from 27 and 20,000 km in 1995 to 264 and 117,900 km in 2023, respectively, the number of landing points and landing countries or regions has increased from 70 and 43 in 1995 to 1144 and 173 in 2023, respectively. According to its development history, the global submarine cable industry can be roughly divided into three stages. The first stage was from 1995 to 2002, which was the rapid growth period. Regulatory support, surging demand, technological advancements and substantial capital injections collectively fueled a boom in the industry. The entry of non-traditional telecommunications operators into submarine cable construction led to a significant increase in the number, length and landing points of submarine cables. The second stage was from 2003 to 2012, which was the reorganization and adjustment period. The over-construction in the previous stage, coupled with limited global market demand, resulted in a severe supply-demand imbalance. This imbalance intensified competition, caused a sharp decline in submarine cable prices, and left a large amount of redundant bandwidth in the digestion stage. Although the number of cables laid and landing points continued to rise, the slow growth in length indicated that newly constructed cables were predominantly small to medium-sized, signaling insufficient development momentum for the submarine cable network. The third stage is from 2013 to present, which is the recovery and expansion period. The acceleration of globalization, along with a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, has propelled information technology forward and significantly increased the demand for international Internet bandwidth. As a result, the global submarine cable network has entered a period of renewal, with investment and construction reaching a new peak. During this period, the quantity, length and number of landing points of submarine cables have all resumed rapid growth and gradually stabilized.

The flow of Internet information and the distribution of data centers dominate the layout of global submarine cables. To comprehensively analyze the evolution trend of submarine cables, Figure 2 depicts the spatio-temporal evolution patterns of lines and their density from 1995 to 2023. Evidently, the diversification of submarine cable lines has become more pronounced over time. In 1995, the laid submarine cables were predominantly concentrated across the Atlantic Ocean, connecting Europe and the Americas. Specifically, these cables traversed between Western and Northern Europe, the Mediterranean coast, the southern US, and the Caribbean coast, with numerous landing points in countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, Sweden and Italy. This early concentration not only underscores the historical significance of Europe and the Americas as the cradles of submarine cable development but also anticipates the prominence of the transatlantic route in global submarine cable construction. Subsequently, the construction of submarine cables expanded rapidly from these regions to other parts of the world. The spatial imbalance of global submarine cable distribution can be clearly seen at the national scale. Except for the countries like Western Sahara, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Eritrea, and DPRK, most coastal countries have laid submarine cables, but only a select few possess a substantial number of cable landing points. Among them, US and UK have maintained a leading edge of the number of international submarine cables since 1995, reaching 56 and 49 respectively in 2023, far surpassing other countries and solidifying their status as major submarine cable powers. Denmark and Singapore are the leaders in the second tier, with over 30 submarine cables landing in 2023, and countries such as Italy, Sweden, France, Japan, and Malaysia also feature prominently in terms of the number of landing cables. Overall, the distribution of landing cables conforms to three main characteristics: more submarine cables are laid in coastal countries on the east, west and south sides of the Eurasian continent, countries guarding important sea lanes (such as Singapore and Egypt), and countries with long and winding coastlines (such as US and Indonesia). The landing points, which are accurate to the city or lower spatial scales like county scale, also exhibits the characteristics of unbalanced spatial distribution as described above, as shown in Figure 3. In 1995, the points were mainly clustered along the European and Caribbean coasts, gradually spreading to other continents and forming five major landing point agglomerations: the European West Coast and Mediterranean Coast, the American East Coast and Caribbean Coast, East Asia and Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Coast, and the African West Coast. US and UK remain at the forefront, with 65 and 52 landing points in 2023 respectively, functioning as global communication hubs. Additionally, Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, and Spain have over 20 landing points, while Sweden, the Bahamas, Denmark and Brazil also rank highly. On the contrary, vast areas of Eastern Europe, southern Africa, Oceania, Latin America, and high latitude regions such as Russia and Canada have relatively sparse submarine cables and fewer landing points, signifying that these regions are yet to develop mature international submarine cable networks.

The disparity in information transmission capabilities of submarine cables is predominantly manifested in their capacity. Consequently, we further explored the spatial distribution characteristics of submarine cable capacity, as shown in Figure 4. It is obvious that the distribution of landing cable capacity at the national level is extremely unbalanced, with a few countries or regions having large landing cable capacity, while most countries or regions have less. Among them, only 5 countries or regions have a landing cable capacity higher than 1000 Tbps, while there are as many as 77 countries or regions with a landing cable capacity less than 30 Tbps, accounting for about half of the total number of landing countries or regions, and the capacity of the remaining countries or regions is concentrated in the range of 30 to 1000 Tbps. In particular, US remains the largest communication flow center in the world with a total capacity of over 2800 Tbps, far exceeding other countries or regions. This is mainly because that Europe-US, Asia-US, and Latin-US are the three directions with the largest international submarine cable bandwidth, and the Middle East and Africa are also connected to US through Europe. However, with the growing diversification of international bandwidth directions across regions, the proportion of bandwidth connecting Asia, Oceania, and Latin America to US within their total international bandwidth has declined, thus weakening US’s core position. Europe represents the region with the highest international bandwidth utilization and serves as a crucial transit point for the Middle East and Africa’s connection to the global Internet. Wherein, UK is the only country apart from US with a total capacity of over 1500 Tbps for landing submarine cables, France has a total capacity of over 1000 Tbps, and countries such as Norway, Spain and Ireland also have a total capacity that ranks among the top in the world. Singapore, Hong Kong (China) and Japan are the largest international bandwidth hubs in Asia, while some Asian countries including Malaysia, Thailand, India and Indonesia are experiencing rapid bandwidth growth, emerging as potential new hubs. In contrast, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Oceania have relatively lower international bandwidth volumes, with data flows predominantly directed towards US and Europe. Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been a discernible increase in intra-regional international bandwidth, accompanied by the emergence of more diversified routing directions. Notably, South Africa, Brazil, and Egypt, with relatively high total landing submarine cable capacities, show significant potential for development into regional communication flow centers. It should be noted that since we can only obtain global submarine cable capacity data for the most recent year (i.e. 2023), considering the analysis consistency, the empirical analysis in the following text will rely on the number of submarine cables and their landing points.

Based on the network construction method mentioned above, we built a matrix of the number of submarine cables between countries or regions from 1995 to 2023, and drew a higher number of connections in country or region pairs, which we referred to as the core connections at the national scale, as shown in Figure 5. As a whole, the number of submarine cable connections between most countries or regions is relatively small, and the more connections there are, the fewer country or region pairs there are. In detail, in 1995, only two country pairs, Denmark-Sweden and Finland-Estonia, had two submarine cable connections between them, while the rest had a single connection. Afterwards, there was a discernible upward trend in the number of connections between country or region pairs. In 2004, 2013, and 2023, there were 906, 1370 and 1491 country or region pairs with submarine cable connections respectively, the proportions of country pairs with four or more connections were 1.55%, 3.80%, and 6.64% respectively, while those with two or fewer connections accounted for 94.48%, 90.51%, and 86.59% respectively, indicating increasingly closer submarine cable interconnections between countries. Among them, Denmark-Sweden led in the number of connections in 2004 and 2013, with 7 and 8 cables respectively, followed closely by Japan-South Korea, US-UK, and India-Saudi Arabia. In 2023, Singapore-Indonesia pair emerged as the leader with 13 cables, the only pair exceeding 10 connections. Egypt-Saudi Arabia, Japan-South Korea, and Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates also had significant connections, each with 9 cables. Spatial analysis reveals that these core connections predominantly involve geographically proximate countries or regions, underscoring the strong spatial proximity of submarine cable connections. In the pattern of core connections, it is mainly composed of a tiny minority of countries or regions such as Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, Egypt, Hong Kong (China), Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Among them, Malaysia, US, Italy and Saudi Arabia frequently appear in these connections, engaging with 10 or more countries or regions. In contrast, countries with early-stage submarine cable development, such as UK, Denmark and Sweden, are less prominent in the core connection pattern. UK only has core connections with a few countries or regions, and Denmark and Sweden mainly connect with each other. This pattern indirectly reflects that some European countries, particularly those in the Nordic region, have not extensively developed submarine cable connections with specific countries or regions.

The country is the service unit of the submarine cable network, while the landing point is the gateway. Further, we considered landing points as the micro scale research object that progresses from the macro scale (country or region). Therefore, we built a matrix of submarine cable connections between each landing point from 1995 to 2023 and drew the distribution pattern of connections, as shown in Figure 6. Overall, the number of connections between landing points has demonstrated a clear upward trajectory. In 1995, 2004, 2013 and 2023, there were 129, 1873, 2997 and 3769 landing point pairs connected by submarine cables respectively. Notably, the connection numbers were relatively low in 1995 and 2004, and it was not until 2013 that landing points with more than five connections began to emerge, which indicates that the vast majority of landing points rely on individual submarine cable systems for information connectivity, with only a select few establishing extensive interconnections. Specifically, numerous multi-connected landing point pairs are concentrated along the southern coast of the Eurasian continent, and there are also many connections between the east and west coasts of US, East Asia and Western Europe. These strongly connected landing point pairs are predominantly distributed between 0° and 55°N, forming a circumferential network encircling the Earth along the latitude line. Key landing points within this network include the west coast of UK, the Mediterranean coast, the Caribbean coast, Fujairah, Zafarana, Mumbai and Singapore. Additionally, several closely connected landing point pairs are found along the east and west coasts of the African continent, forming two meridian-oriented connection clusters. Among the landing point pairs with a high number of submarine cable connections, Jeddah-Mumbai led in 2013 and 2023, with 7 and 8 connections respectively. Other pairs such as Fujairah-Mumbai, Hong Kong-Singapore, Accra-Lagos, Fujairah-Jeddah, Suez-Jeddah, Suez-Mumbai, and Fortaleza-Rio de Janeiro had more than 5 connections. In 2023, there were three landing point pairs with over five connections, namely Fujairah-Karachi, Jeddah-Mumbai, and Shanghai-Hong Kong, expanding the core scope of submarine cable connections. Among them, Fujairah, Mumbai and Jeddah frequently appeared in these connections, each participating in three pairs. Spatial analysis reveals that these landing points are geographically proximate, showing that landing point pairs with extensive submarine cable connections, similar to country or region pairs, exhibit strong geographical proximity. It is important to note that during the network analysis, although each landing point was initially considered separately, due to the large number of closely-located landing points under the jurisdiction of Changi, Hong Kong and Shanghai at the highest connection level, representing these landing points separately would weaken their actual position in the information network and make the regional network more chaotic. Hence, in order to ensure consistency in the scale of the first level landing points and simplify spatial analysis, all landing points under the jurisdiction of Changi, Hong Kong and Shanghai were uniformly named after their respective cities, a convention followed in subsequent figures and tables.

Still further, we used CNA method to calculate the degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality of global submarine cable network nodes to inquire into the role of important landing points in the network from 1995 to 2023, as shown in Table 2. On the whole, the centrality of the global submarine cable network exhibits significant spatio-temporal variation characteristic, and the variation of each centrality is different. For instance, it can be seen that landing points with high degree centrality are few and scattered, while those with low centrality are numerous and common. High level landing points remain largely unchanged during the research period, such as Mumbai, Fujairah, Jeddah, Hong Kong and so on, which have high direct accessibility and are connected to plenty of other landing points in the network, while there are 159 landing points with a degree centrality below 1, meaning that their direct accessibility is relatively small in the network, and they can only form direct connections with the handful landing points. As for closeness centrality, its variation characteristics are completely different from the degree centrality, with generally high value and uniform distribution worldwide. We used Jenks Natural Breaks method to divided closeness centrality values into five levels and found that the highest and second level landing points accounted for over 60% of all landing points in 2004, 2013 and 2023 respectively, while the number of lower-level landing points was relatively small and concentrated in Europe, especially in Eastern and Northern Europe, indicating that most landing points have relatively small differences in relative accessibility and have open location advantage in the network, while some landing points in Europe do not have this advantage but rely heavily on other landing points in the process of network connection. The distribution characteristics of betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality values are similar to degree centrality and closeness centrality, respectively.

Furthermore, the global submarine cable network exhibits distinct clustering characteristics, a phenomenon that becomes more pronounced over time, as shown in Figure 7. Leveraging the community detection theory within the framework of CNA, despite the relatively fewer and less intricate nodes in the global submarine cable network in 1995, five communities had already formed. With the exception of the community encompassing landing points along the Caribbean coast, such as Basseterre, Bridgetown, and Castries, which featured more complex interconnections, the node centrality within the other communities remained low, and connections were predominantly simple. Subsequently, as the submarine cable industry experienced rapid growth, the number of landing points increased significantly, and connections became more intricate and diverse, leading to a more complex network structure. In 2004, 2013 and 2023, the number of network communities all exceeded 50, with 5, 8, and 6 communities having nodes that accounted for more than 5% of the total number of nodes in that year respectively. Affected by geographical proximity, a notable “hugging together for warmth” phenomenon emerged among nodes within each community. For example, it has formed the “Asian community” led by many high centrality landing points such as Mumbai, Jeddah, Fujairah and Hong Kong (in 2023, it split into the “Persian Gulf-Red Sea Coast community” led by Mumbai, Jeddah and Fujairah, and the “East Asia-Southeast Asia community” led by Hong Kong, Shanghai and Batangas), the “Latin America community” (or the “Caribbean Coastal community”) led by Puerto Barrios, Fortaleza and Nassau, and the “Southern African community” led by Accra, Abidjan and Lagos, and these communities have multitudinous nodes and several leaders with higher level. In contrast, landing points in Europe and US have yet to form distinct and independent communities. Instead, they are predominantly integrated into the aforementioned communities, and their status within these communities remains relatively modest. Although they possess numerous landing points and extensive connections, these landing points are positioned at the semi-periphery or even the periphery of the global submarine cable node network. This is primarily due to the large number of landing points in these regions, which disperses the focus of external connectivity, offering multiple options and alternatives, thereby resulting in generally low node centrality. Moreover, the majority of European countries lack an edge in territorial area and coastline length. With the exception of UK, Western and Northern European countries face a complex marine landscape environment, leading to shorter submarine cables, limited international connections, and a preponderance of internal European linkages, relegating Europe to the margins of the global submarine cable network at the landing point scale. These observations underscore the indispensable role of developing countries and their landing points in the global communication landscape, providing novel insights for analyzing the global digital divide.

The submarine cable network mainly affects the global digital divide through the following three paths:

(1) Infrastructure universalization. From the perspective of coverage expansion, the continuous laying of submarine cables continues to extend the reach of digital networks, enabling more remote areas to access high-speed Internet. Taking Cambodia as an example, in the past, due to weak digital infrastructure, the network coverage in rural areas was extremely low, and a large number of residents were unable to enjoy the convenience brought by digital technology. With the advancement of submarine cable projects and the construction of related supporting facilities, Cambodia is committed to improving the coverage of digital platforms. According to the government’s plan, Cambodia will achieve the goal of 100% high-speed Internet coverage in urban areas and 70% coverage in rural areas in 2025 (Government of Cambodia, 2021). The realization of this goal will enable more rural residents to access the Internet, participate in the digital economy and social activities, provide them with access to educational resources, medical information and employment opportunities, break the digital isolation caused by geographical restrictions, and promote the balanced distribution of digital resources between urban and rural areas. In terms of cost-effectiveness, submarine cables have significant advantages. Despite the huge initial investment, complex technology and high equipment costs involved in the laying of submarine cables, their unit data transmission costs are relatively low in the long run and scale effects. This means that with the expansion of submarine cable networks, not only can the cost of digital services be reduced, but it can also promote the development of digital economy in connected regions. In African coastal countries, with the access of submarine cables, Internet service providers can provide network services at a lower cost, making more residents can afford to access the Internet, thus improving the Internet penetration rate. At the same time, the growth of the digital economy has attracted more investment, further promoting the improvement and development of local digital infrastructure, forming a virtuous cycle, effectively promoting the popularization of digital infrastructure in a wider range of regions, and narrowing the gap in digital access between different regions.

(2) Digital ecosystem reconstruction. The development of submarine cable network has profoundly changed the global digital ecosystem, resulting in reconstruction effects in key areas such as education and healthcare, providing new opportunities to alleviate the many problems caused by the digital divide. In the field of education, the BELLA submarine cable project, a collaboration between the European Union and Latin America, has increased the research network bandwidth of Brazil and Portugal to 100 Gbps, making it easier for researchers in Latin America to access the Large Hadron Collider in Geneva (European Commission, 2015). The project also supports the Latin America-Europe Joint Online Laboratory, which enables the synchronous transmission of observation data from the Astronomical and Cosmic Ray Observatories in the Atacama Desert in Chile to European research institutions. This project narrows the gap in educational resources between developed and developing countries, providing students and researchers in developing countries with the opportunity to access globally leading research resources and quality education. The medical field also benefits from the digital ecosystem reconstruction brought by submarine cables. The remote medical system utilizes submarine cables for high-speed data transmission, enabling experts to remotely diagnose and consult patients in remote areas. In Southeast Asian island countries, the application of remote medical systems has reduced the response time for expert consultations from days or even longer in the past to several hours. Halodoc, a remote medical platform in Indonesia, has over 20 million active users. Through this platform, patients can have real-time video or text consultations with doctors, easily obtain professional medical advice, and medicines can be delivered to their homes. It provides home delivery services in 400 cities and claims that people in 120 cities can receive deliveries within 15 minutes after an order is placed (Shibata and Damayanti, 2023). This greatly improves the uneven distribution of medical resources, allowing patients in remote areas to access expert level medical services in a timely manner, improving the accessibility and fairness of medical services, and reducing health disparities caused by geographical distance and differences in medical resources.

(3) Economic empowerment. As a critical infrastructure for the digital economy, the submarine cable network unlocks multifaceted economic empowerment pathways for countries and regions along its routes. It significantly influences digital trade and employment transformation, thereby facilitating the adjustment of the global economic landscape and alleviating the digital divide. In the realm of digital trade, submarine cables’ high-speed and stable connectivity propels the growth of digital trade modalities, exemplified by China-ASEAN cross-border e-commerce. These cables’ efficient data transmission enables businesses to streamline order processing, engage with global customers, and empowers consumers to access international markets. Chinese e-commerce platforms leverage submarine cables to establish robust digital trade links with ASEAN nations, facilitating the reciprocal flow of goods. This digital trade dynamism stimulates economic growth, fosters opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises, elevates developing countries’ standing in the global digital economy, and narrows trade-related digital disparities with developed counterparts. Regarding employment transformation, the digital economy bolstered by submarine cables generates novel job opportunities, catalyzing labor migration from traditional to digital sectors. As submarine cable networks expand and digital infrastructure advances, enterprises undergo digital transformation, driving up demand for digital technology talent. In emerging economies like India, the proliferation of submarine cable access has spurred young workers’ transition from agriculture and manufacturing to software development, digital marketing, and e-commerce. These digital occupations not only offer higher remuneration and career prospects but also enhance workers’ digital literacy, promoting economic equity and mitigating digital divide-induced social and economic disparities.

The distribution and spatial variation characteristics of submarine cables can to some extent reflect the spatial imbalance of global digital infrastructure layout. Different from the common socio-economic statistical indicators such as Internet or telephone penetration rate and indexes issued by organizations or institutions, we took advantage of submarine cable data to more objectively describe the current situation, evolution and future trend of the global digital divide from different scales. Firstly, we calculated the average of the four types of centrality in the global submarine cable network for each landing country or region or landing point during the study period. Secondly, we calculated the average of the annual values and integrate them into a score for each country or region and landing point. Then, we used JNB method to sort them, thus selecting the top 30 and bottom 30 landing countries or regions and landing points, as shown in Figure 8. It is not difficult to observe that the hierarchical structure of landing countries or regions and landing points follows a typical pyramid type, namely the more important the country or region or landing point, the fewer there are. At the national level, US ranks at the top of the pyramid running rings round other countries or regions and is a veritable submarine cable power with absolute voice, UK, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia are located in the second tier, all of which are typical island countries with long coastlines and prominent strategic positions in the regional and even global geopolitical pattern, making them natural locations for submarine cable layouts, and the other countries or regions located at the upper part of the pyramid are mostly in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, with developed and developing countries or regions almost evenly divided. Nevertheless, at the bottom of the pyramid, there are massive developing countries, generally located in Africa, Latin America and Oceania. These countries are often on the edge of the competitive landscape between nations, or can be referred to as “invisible countries” by reason of their small land areas, weak comprehensive national strength or low openness to the outside world, making them difficult to undertake global communication transmission tasks. At the landing point scale, Mumbai and Fujairah have the most prominent centrality, and are the two landing points with the strongest direct accessibility, relative accessibility, and transfer and cohesion functions in the global submarine cable network, which is consistent with the description of distribution pattern and network structure in the previous text, fully demonstrating that they are strategic pivots in the global submarine cable network. The second level landing points are Jeddah, Hong Kong and Singapore (including Tuas and Changi), which also have extremely important strategic positions in the global submarine cable network. There are a large number of third and fourth level landing points with wide coverage, which have important strategic significance for regional submarine cable network security although they have a slightly lower global impact on the network than first and second level. For example, Suez, Zafarana and Alexandria are key nodes connecting Asia and Europe, especially the Red Sea and Mediterranean, with important transfer and cohesion functions; Shanghai, California and Fortaleza are vital gateways to China, US and Brazil respectively, with relatively open geographical advantages. The first four levels of landing points constitute the core acupoints of the global submarine cable network, which means that once they lose efficacy or are constrained, the global submarine cable network will be hit globally or regionally. By contrast, at the bottom of the pyramid are hundreds of landing points, concentrated in Africa, Latin America and Europe. According to the previous analysis, the submarine cable system in Europe is complicated, with all coastal countries having submarine cables and most countries having multiple routes, bringing numerous and scattered landing points, thereby dispersing the network centrality of landing points in Europe. As a result, small landing points in Europe that receive fewer submarine cables are located at the bottom of the pyramid. The difference is that the solid majority of developing countries are at a disadvantage in the global Internet pattern dominated by developed countries due to their weak economic foundation, imperfect information infrastructure and unfavorable geopolitical factors. Therefore, they have a small number of submarine cables and landing points, and their submarine cable network is regional, which has not really formed the global network connected to most countries in the world, especially developed countries, eventuating their landing points being at the bottom of the pyramid.

Hence one can see that both at the national and landing point scales, there is currently a significant “poverty gap” in the world from the perspective of submarine cables, which also reveals that the global digital divide is still significant. Although the submarine cable mainly involves the difference in the possession of communication infrastructure by users in different countries, namely the digital access divide, the upgrading of its key technologies and operation modes, the improvement of the quality of information acquisition by the public, and the expansion of social and economic benefits have become the direction of global communication network optimization and Internet competition at present and in the future, which can profoundly reflect the digital skill divide and the digital outcome divide. However, it is worth noting that in the pyramid structure of landing points, landing points in developing countries such as Mumbai, Fujairah, Jeddah and Hong Kong are located at the top of the pyramid, and during the research period, the number of submarine cables undertaken by these landing points and the number of connected countries have generally increased, indicating that their status in the global submarine cable network continues to heighten. Although this can show the dilemma of developing countries being limited by economic strength and geopolitical competition and only able to build a few landing points, it still fully reflects the durative promotion of digital infrastructure construction and development of the digital economy by developing countries, and the global digital divide phenomenon is being alleviated.

Despite the potential of submarine cables to mitigate the global digital divide, the intricate nature of this issue presents formidable challenges to global governance efforts. One of the primary obstacles stems from the divergence in digital development strategies among nations, which has fueled international competition and confrontation. Constrained by limited national capabilities, developing countries often experience sluggish progress in implementing digital development strategies, exacerbating the existing gap with developed counterparts. Moreover, digital hegemonic powers impede global digital divide governance by erecting digital barriers, thereby intensifying international tensions. Firstly, the high threshold of digital development constitutes a significant hurdle. Digital transformation necessitates a comprehensive array of development elements, including infrastructure construction, digital technology, financial resources, innovative concepts, talent cultivation, digital enterprises, and a conducive digital environment. Developing countries’ lag in digital development and entrapment in the global digital divide can be attributed to the severe deficiency of these essential components. Take submarine cables as an example: the industry’s value chain encompasses engineering-procurement-construction (EPC) activities, as well as the manufacturing, surveying, construction, and maintenance of cables. The high technical requirements and construction complexities inherent in these processes have concentrated each segment predominantly in a select group of developed nations. Currently, only US, France, Japan, and China possess a complete industrial chain. In contrast, most developing countries face constraints in technology, funding and human resources, rendering them unable to independently produce and operate submarine cables. Issues such as aging equipment, limited communication range and speed further contribute to the high concentration of the global submarine cable industry, thereby creating a “submarine cable divide”.

Digital hegemony further exacerbates international competition and confrontation. The emergence and evolution of the global digital divide have given rise to digital hegemonic practices, which in turn perpetuate the divide and obstruct governance efforts. Submarine cables have long been a strategic focus for major powers, shaping the course of modern geopolitical rivalries and influencing international relations. From US cutting off submarine cables connecting Spain to the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War, to UK cutting off five transatlantic submarine cables from Germany during World War I and Japanese cables connecting Saigon, Singapore and Hong Kong during World War II, to submarine cables became a prominent part of the US and Soviet vied for hegemony during the Cold War, and to the PRISM of US in this century, submarine cables gradually expanded the dimension of international infrastructure competition, forming four major competitive fields: security (serving national strategy and diplomacy, including intelligence transmission, military communication, etc.), development (helping to promote economic and trade cooperation between countries, including financial transactions, digital economy, etc.), technology and space. In recent years, major powers’ comprehensive suppression of other countries, particularly developing nations, across these domains has become a defining characteristic of digital competition. By monopolizing and blocking digital technologies, digital hegemonic powers seek to maintain their dominance, intensifying international digital rivalries and impeding global digital divide governance. Nevertheless, developing countries have persisted in pursuing digital development strategies despite these challenges. Emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and South Korea have achieved notable progress in digital development, gradually emerging as pivotal nodes within the global submarine cable network.

On the other hand, the global digital divide governance system remains conspicuously underdeveloped. Presently, the global digital divide is characterized by a chaotic and disorganized state, marked by a dearth of cohesive governance entities and fragmented governance authority. This fragmentation impedes the integration of existing international resources for effective digital divide governance. Simultaneously, the absence of comprehensive governance rules, disparities in regulatory standards within the digital governance domain, and cutthroat competition among stakeholders have further exacerbated this disorder. Firstly, the governance landscape is characterized by a dispersed array of actors, with a conspicuous absence of a central governing entity. Governance power is fragmented across various international actors. Traditionally, sovereign states have been the primary subjects of global governance. However, with the advancement of globalization and the intensification of international cooperation, non-state actors have increasingly participated in global governance, assuming more substantial responsibilities. In the digital era, alongside sovereign states and international organizations, Internet giants, products of digital technological advancements, have emerged as significant players in governance, leading to a multi-stakeholder governance paradigm. The realm of submarine cables exemplifies this trend. A significant number of submarine cables are constructed by private institutions, with deep-sea key pipeline and line construction funding predominantly driven by major Internet enterprises. Over the past three decades, approximately 90% of submarine cable construction funding, amounting to around 43 billion dollars, has originated from consortia, indicating that ownership and maintenance of these cables lie primarily with global business groups (Bueger and Liebetrau, 2021). The planning, production, operation, and maintenance of submarine cables are predominantly in the hands of the private sector, with leading suppliers including SubCom (US), Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) and Nexans (France), NEC Corporation (NEC) (Japan), HMN Technologies (HMN) (China), Prysmian (Italy), and Luster (Denmark). Among them, SubCom, ASN, NEC and HMN are the world’s only four submarine cable integrators with cross-continental delivery capabilities, dominating the global market. In addition to private enterprises, international organizations also play pivotal roles. The European Union, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and European Investment Bank actively enhance cross-border submarine cable network connectivity through investment and aid initiatives. International non-governmental cooperation organizations are also actively involved; for instance, the Atlantic Cable Maintenance Agreement (ACMA), a non-profit submarine cable maintenance cooperative, currently comprises around 70 cable company members. Nevertheless, the multi-stakeholder governance model lacks a central coordinating entity to unify efforts, allocate resources, and drive effective governance. While the diversification of governance actors can mobilize global resources for digital divide governance, disparities in governance philosophies, objectives, and interests among actors often lead to governance deadlocks.

Furthermore, governance rules and standards serve as the bedrock of global digital divide governance and are essential for constructing an effective global governance framework. Although the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables in 1884 and the Geneva Convention on the High Seas in 1958 are established international treaties related to submarine cables, their regulatory scope is limited, primarily covering cable laying and repair in international waters, excluding exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. These treaties have also proven ineffective in deterring predatory practices by business entities. For example, in 2023, US House of Representatives subcommittee passed the Submarine Cable Control Act, aiming to restrict foreign competitors in the domestic submarine cable industry to safeguard national interests. This case underscores the weak willingness of some sovereign states to engage in autonomous governance. Instead, they prioritize national interests over international law, undermining the efficacy of international legal mechanisms and diminishing their regulatory capacity.