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Journal of Geographical Sciences >

2021 , Vol. 31 >Issue 8: 1205 - 1221

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11442-021-1893-1

Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale

  • REN Yisheng , 1 ,
  • LU Lin , 2, * ,
  • YU Hu 3 ,
  • ZHU Daocai 4
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  • 1. School of Economics and Management, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241002, Anhui, China
  • 2. School of Geography and Tourism, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241002, Anhui, China
  • 3. Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, CAS, Beijing 100101, China
  • 4. City and County Research Center, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, Anhui, China
*Lu Lin, PhD and Professor, specialized in tourism geography. E-mail:

Ren Yisheng, PhD and Instructor, specialized in urban geography and urban economics. E-mail:

Received date: 2021-04-29

  Accepted date: 2021-06-20

  Online published: 2021-10-25

Supported by

Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China(41930644)

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Abstract

China's policy on ecological compensation (eco-compensation) in watershed ecosystems is of economic, social and environmental significance for China's ecological governance and protection of natural areas. It involves balancing the interests of regional stakeholders, coordinating the development of regional environments and establishing effective cooperation models, making it a classic topic for geographical research. This study introduces the concept of institutional “stickiness” to the theory of politics of scale to analyze the features and mechanisms of the game behavior of government entities in the process of implementing watershed eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin. Our results show the following: government entities at various levels, including the central, provincial and municipal governments, experienced the three stages of game strategy of competition, cooperation and “coopetition”; building a government community of shared interests can promote watershed eco-compensation, and “appropriate intervention” by the central government is key to achieving inter-provincial watershed eco-compensation; there was clear institutional stickiness during the transition from a “vertical” model of watershed eco-compensation to a “vertical-horizontal” model, with government entities using policy innovations and social participation to limit and reduce stickiness so as to reshape the watershed eco-compensation system; scalar jumping is the core mechanism that promoted eco-compensation in the study basin, and government entities shaped the discourse on watershed eco-compensation by redistributing powers and capital and creating informal constraints, which promoted the transformation of eco-compensation from a “strong state-weak society” structural model, to a “strong state-strong society” model in the Xin'an River Basin. These results can provide theoretical support for the construction of inter-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanisms, provide a scientific basis for the rational evaluation and guidance of watershed eco-compensation practices, and promote the coordinated and sustainable socioeconomic development of watersheds.

Key words： eco-compensation; scalar jumping; institutional stickiness; game strategy; Xin'an River Basin

Cite this article

REN Yisheng , LU Lin , YU Hu , ZHU Daocai . Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale[J]. Journal of Geographical Sciences, 2021 , 31(8) : 1205 -1221 . DOI: 10.1007/s11442-021-1893-1

1 Introduction

Accelerating the sustainable succession of watershed ecosystems and the effective use of service functions and establishing sound watershed ecological compensation (eco-compensation) mechanisms are real-life requirements for promoting the sustainable socioeconomic development of watersheds. A watershed is a dynamic regional ecological system dominated by water, and it is a typical geographic unit for implementing ecological protection and eco- compensation. The eco-environment of a watershed is a natural entity on which the formation and evolution of human socioeconomic systems depend, and it directly impacts the succession of forest and grassland ecosystems and the sustainability of human materials needed for production and everyday life. Human interference with the eco-environments of river basins has exacerbated ecological problems, resulting in water shortages, water pollution and water-related disasters. Problems with inter-regional resource flows and related cooperation have gradually been exacerbated, impacting regional economic cooperation and leading to regional friction. As an important economic, social and environmental policy, watershed eco-compensation is a key measure for ensuring the sustainable socioeconomic development of such localities and a necessary choice for the unified utilization of resources and regional coordinated development of watersheds. Politics of scale theory, which is based on spatial analysis in geography, is utilized in this study to analyze watershed eco-compensation strategies and evaluate the cooperative management model and mechanisms in watersheds disturbed by humans.
Since the 1990s, eco-compensation has been viewed by academia and government leaders as an effective policy tool for dealing with environmental issues and a means of making ecosystem service trade-off decisions (Zhang et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2017; Zhao, 2017). Watersheds encompass multiple elements and multiple subjects, so watershed eco-compensation is an important part of eco-compensation (Liu et al., 2015). Research on watershed eco-compensation by Chinese and overseas researchers have tended to focus on two areas. The first is analysis of watershed eco-compensation using the theories of public goods (Bennett and Gosnell, 2015), externality (Qiao et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2018) and ecosystem service value (Shang et al., 2018). The other is to construct eco-compensation mechanisms and models for watersheds of different sizes and levels in order to promote the sustainable evolution of the human-land relationship in watersheds (Cao et al., 2019). This has been achieved by comprehensively considering the heterogeneity of watershed spaces (Liu et al., 2014), exploring the subjects and objects of watershed eco-compensation and their interest relationships (Li et al., 2017), as well as using the conditioned value (He et al., 2015), opportunity cost (Xu et al., 2018), and ecological service value supply (Wang and Li, 2019). The above research mainly analyzes the quantitative problem of watershed eco-compensation from the perspective of ecological service value, as well as by defining the rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders, but this ignores the role of administrative power in the formation of the watershed eco-compensation mechanism. There has also been insufficient exploration of the game strategies of different government entities, so the game methods and scalar jumping of different stakeholders require further analysis.
Scale is a core concept in geography that indicates the level of spatial uniqueness (Wang and Liu, 2015). It is the level of surface features, experience and organization of geographic events and geographic processes, with the dual characteristics of horizontal scope and vertical hierarchy (Wang and Liu, 2017). There are obvious spatial differences at different scales, and the evolution of scale relations is the dynamic product of social and political construction. With the transformation of communication technology and the rapid development of information technology since the 1970s, major changes have occurred to the global economic structure, and various countries have carried out different forms of spatial reconstruction. Meanwhile, human geography in the West has undergone a scalar turn and begun to pay attention to the social construction of scale (Lu et al., 2020), which has promoted the relativization of scale among geographers, with politics of scale gradually becoming an important research topic in human geography. The politics of scale is a relatively expansive topic, with scholars outside China having conducted research on urban governance (Mills and Waite, 2017), resource development (Crow-Miller and Webber, 2017), social welfare (Harrison, 2006), and social crisis governance (Beery, 2016). Research by Chinese scholars, meanwhile, has mainly focused on social events (Liu and Wang, 2011b), urban development (Xu and Liu, 2019), geo-security (Zhang et al., 2017), and strategic planning (Wang and Liu, 2019). In general, Chinese and overseas research on politics of scale covers a wide range of fields and focuses more on theoretical research, and it has created a relatively comprehensive research system. Watershed eco-compensation involves interest and responsibility relationships between different entities. The theory of politics of scale and its evolution process reflects the core mechanisms of watershed eco-environmental governance. The application of politics of scale to watershed eco-compensation research can offer a new perspective from which to reveal the development principles behind watershed eco-compensation.
Given the foregoing, this study uses China's first pilot inter-provincial watershed eco- compensation mechanism in the Xin'an River Basin as a case study, introduces institutional stickiness into the politics of scale theory, analyzes the interests and game strategies of different government entities involved in watershed eco-compensation and discusses the game features and mechanisms of those government entities, in the hope of promoting the sustainable development of the Xin'an River Basin and serving as a reference for the construction of a market-oriented watershed eco-compensation mechanism.

2 Theoretical basis

The scale of watershed eco-compensation is based on the geographical scope of different administrative divisions and whether it is at the central government, provincial government, municipal government or other government administrative level, though it can also fall under informal social organizations. Eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin is a typical government-led compensation model. Changes in the power structure and relationship between the central government and local governments can break the path dependence of the traditional economic development model and the original benefit distribution pattern and encourage the reallocation of economic, social and ecological interests, in order to promote changes in the watershed eco-compensation system. As a result, this article adopts a combination of institutional stickiness and politics of scale to analyze game features and mechanisms of interests between the central and local governments.

2.1 Institutional stickiness

2.1.1 Systems

A system is a type of constraint that is artificially designed and shapes interactions between people. It reflects the economic relationship between people, and it is composed of formal constraints, informal constraints and implementation mechanisms (Coase, 1960). Formal constraints, which mainly consist of political rules, economic rules and contracts, are policies and rules that people consciously create and are the result of public choices. Formal constraints are compulsory. They directly regulate people's activities in fields such as politics, the economy, society, culture and the environment. They reflect the basic orientation of a social system and social development. Informal constraints mainly consist of values, beliefs, traditions, norms and customs (Sun, 2009). They are created by people unconsciously through long-term social interactions. They have a natural evolution process and enduring vitality. Informal constraints “supplement” formal constraints. Formal constraints will act on informal constraints. The two restrict and promote each other, and they jointly constitute a constraint on holders of rights (Lu, 2002). The implementation mechanism is the result of the combined effect of formal and informal constraints. Only by establishing an effective implementation mechanism can a system's executive power be improved.

2.1.2 Institutional stickiness

Institutional stickiness is one of the most important concepts in the historical institutionalism school. It refers to the fact that due to the rigidity of a system, institutional adjustments cannot be made quickly, thus maintaining an original state and creating a trend of self-replication and self-reinforcement (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). The main reason for the formation of institutional stickiness is an inconsistency between institutional supply and demand. In the process of cognition, organization and initiation of institutional changes, the phenomenon of time lag is widespread. Institutional stickiness means that changes will be constrained by the old institutional structure, exhibiting characteristics of path dependence (Wang, 2018). Under the constraints of the current system, path dependence in institutional links makes institutional reform dependent on regulatory policies. It is difficult to eliminate the constraints of institutional stickiness, which has become an important source of the “strong state-weak society” governance pattern. Institutional stickiness is related to local government (Zhu et al., 2018). Interest groups shape policies, and policies also shape interest groups. Interest groups make judgments based on policy functions and their own values, and then redistribute their political and institutional resources accordingly. Once a certain institutional model is formed, it will be self-sustaining and self-reinforcing, which is expressed as institutional stickiness and path dependence.

2.2 Scalar jumping

Due to the globalization of capital and “space-time compression”, “flow space” is replacing “local space” (Wang et al., 2016). As the rigid constraints set by tangible geographic boundaries between traditional countries and regions have begun to weaken, there has been a gradual shift toward invisible and elastic porous boundaries, which has accelerated the de-regionalization and re-regionalization of factors of production. This, in turn, has prompted changes in the post-Fordist system of flexible accumulation and caused a transformation and reconstruction of the value of national and regional spaces. Neil Smith proposed the concept of politics of scale for the first time in Uneven Development and set out its core concept of “scalar jumping” (Smith, 2010). In politics of scale, there are usually two opposing interest groups: the strong and the weak. Based on the needs and features of their interests, the two groups use their own power or use third-party power to carry out the necessary scalar jumping (Figure 1), so as to occupy a scale space that is conducive to the realization of their own interests.
Figure 1 Theoretical framework of the politics of scale

2.2.1 Downscaling

The strong party uses its social resources or power to limit and suppress the expression of interests by the weak party, thereby restricting the actions and demands of the weak party to lower-level spaces, that is, to achieve downscaling. In response to specific scale strategies adopted by the weak party, the strong party will also use administrative power to achieve an administrative monopoly, such as a regional blockade or forced transaction. It will also use discourse subjects and discourse isolation to strengthen its discourse power in administrative decision-making, in order to obtain more economic benefits and continue to strengthen boundaries around low-level scalar spaces, thus preventing the weak party from upscaling.

2.2.2 Upscaling

The weak party uses the two methods of direct game and mobilizing outside support to fight the strong party and break through the size constraints of the strong party (Zhang et al., 2017), as well as to change the balance of power between the two sides (Liu and Wang, 2011b), that is, to achieve upscaling. The weak party relies on public opinion, deep cooperation, self-improvement and other means to directly game with the strong party (Zhang et al., 2017), as well as to break the path dependence of traditional spaces, and change the position, influence and power relationship of low-level spaces. If the game fails, the weak party will use news media, joint statements and other means to mobilize external resources, gain the trust and support of a third party, break the inherent interest pattern, and ensure that it is in a favorable position in low-level space competition. Once sufficient third-party support is obtained, the weak party can counter the strong party to safeguard its own interests (Liu and Wang, 2011a; Liu and Wang, 2011b), change the uneven power structure between the parties and form a new power space structure.

3 Eco-compensation game features and mechanisms of government entities in the Xin'an River Basin

3.1 Pilot project of eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin

The Xin'an River rises at Liugujian in Xiuning County, Anhui Province. It has a mainstream length of approximately 359 km and a drainage area of 11,452.5 km2. It is the third largest water system in Anhui Province, after the Yangtze River and the Huaihe River, and it is the largest river that flows into the Qiandao Lake. The upper reaches of the Xin'an River Basin include the entire territory of Tunxi District, Huizhou District and Shexian County in the city of Huangshan in Anhui, and parts of the city's Huangshan District, Qimen County, Xiuning District and Yixian County as well as Jixi County in the city of Xuancheng. The upper mainstream is 242.3 km in length, and the upper reaches cover an area of 6736.8 km2, accounting for 58.8% of the river's total drainage area. The lower reaches include the whole of Chun'an County in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province and parts of the city of Jiande. The lower mainstream is approximately 116.7 km in length, and the lower reaches of the river cover an area of 4715.7 km2, accounting for 41.2% of the total drainage area (Figure 2).
Figure 2 Xin'an River Basin
Since the 1990s, conflict between socioeconomic development and environmental protection in the upper and lower reaches of the Xin'an River Basin have become increasingly prominent, and problems such as environmental destruction and soil erosion have spread, restricting the sustainable socioeconomic development of the basin. To encourage eco-environmental protection in the upper reaches of the Xin'an River Basin and ensure use of the eco-environment in the lower reaches, Anhui and Zhejiang provinces repeatedly submitted proposals on water resources and eco-environmental protection in the Xin'an River Basin to the National People's Congress. In 2004, the Environment Protection and Resources Conservation Committee of the National People's Congress conducted a special survey on socioeconomic development and eco-environmental protection in the Xin'an River Basin, which led to the proposal to establish a demonstration zone for the joint development and sharing of the basin. In 2012, under the organization and coordination of the state and with the agreement of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces, China's first inter-provincial watershed eco-compensation mechanism was implemented in the Xin'an River Basin (Table 1), thereby overcoming the previous inability of watershed eco-compensation to transcend provincial boundaries and serving as an important demonstration for coordinating eco-environmental protection in transboundary watersheds.
Table 1 Details of the Xin'an River Basin Eco-Compensation Pilot Scheme
Item Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Pilot period 2012‒2014 2015‒2017 2018‒2020
Basic principles Prioritize protection, reasonable compensation; maintain water quality and strive for improvement; mainly local, with central supervision; monitoring for evidence to supplement and promote governance Same as round 1 Same as round 1
Compensation model The central government and Anhui and Zhejiang provinces set up the Xin'an River Basin Water Environment Compensation Fund Same as round 1 Based on financial transfer payments, the Xin'an River Basin Water Environment Compensation Fund was jointly established by Anhui and Zhejiang provinces
Pilot funding 300 million yuan each year from central government and 100 million yuan each year from Anhui and Zhejiang provinces Diminishing investment of 400 million, 300 million yuan and 200 million yuan from central government and 200 million yuan each year from Anhui and Zhejiang provinces 200 million yuan each year from Anhui and Zhejiang provinces and seek central financial support
Assessment basis Water quality monitoring data from cross-border areas Same as round 1 Same as round 1
Assessment index Compensation index p calculated based on the annual averages of permanganate index, ammonia nitrogen, total phosphorus, and total nitrogen (2008‒2010) as the basic limits, with water quality stability coefficient k being 0.85. Compensation index p calculated based on the annual averages of permanganate index, ammonia nitrogen, total phosphorus, and total nitrogen (2012‒2014) as the basic limits, with water quality stability coefficient of 0.89. The weights of the four indicators of ammonia nitrogen, permanganate index, total nitrogen and total phosphorus were adjusted to 22%, 22%, 28%, 28%, and the water quality stability coefficient k was 0.90
Assessment method Joint monitoring by Anhui and Zhejiang, approved by China National Environmental Monitoring Center and provided to the Ministry of Finance and the former Ministry of Environmental Protection Same as round 1 Same as round 1
Compensation method If p≤1, Zhejiang Province compensates Anhui Province 100 million yuan; if p>1, Anhui Province compensates Zhejiang Province 100 million yuan; the central government allocates all funds to Anhui Province If p≤1, Zhejiang Province compensates Anhui Province 100 million yuan; if p>1, Anhui Province compensates Zhejiang Province 100 million yuan; if p≤0.95, Zhejiang Province compensates Anhui Province another 100 million yuan; the central government allocates all funds to Anhui Province In a given year, if water quality reaches assessment standard, Zhejiang Province compensates Anhui Province 200 million yuan; if water quality does not meet assessment standard, Anhui Province compensates Zhejiang Province 200 million yuan
Use of funds Industrial structure adjustment and industry layout optimization in river basin, protection of water environment and control of water pollution in river basin, ecological protection in river basin, etc. Additional 100 million yuan each for Anhui and Zhejiang mainly for waste and sewage treatment in city of Huangshan, especially rural waste and sewage treatment Encourage and support the establishment of green funds, public and private capital cooperation model, financing discounts, etc., to guide private capital to increase river basin governance and green industry investment

Note: Data is from the Ecological Construction and Protection Bureau of the Xin'an River Basin in Huangshan.

3.2 Game features of government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin

3.2.1 Game behavior of government entities

Eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin is a government-led model mainly involving three levels of government: municipal, provincial and central. Conducting eco-compensation in the watershed is a requirement for socioeconomic development, and it is the result of the mutual game between governments at the various levels. In the different development stages of eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin, government entities at all levels have used dynamic game strategies, which can be classified as competitive, cooperative and “coopetitive”, to maximize their own interests.
During the loose stage (1998‒2003), municipal governments pursued the rational strategy of maximizing their own interests, so there was classic competitive game behavior, making it difficult to carry out eco-compensation in the watershed. Municipal governments adopted a bottom-up approach and passed on eco-compensation to the provincial government (Figure 3). There were attempts to find strategic space for rational self-recognition and to seek a development path, with a vertical structure of watershed eco-compensation involving municipal and provincial governments. Efforts to enhance their own competitive advantages and maximize benefits, meant it was difficult for municipal governments to reach a binding agreement, and the eco-environmental protection cooperation agreement was a mere formality. The municipal governments engaged in market competition, and the competitive game structure formed by an excessive scope of action was difficult to overcome (Wang, 2015), so watershed eco-compensation was in the loose stage.
Figure 3 Game strategies adopted by the various levels of government at different stages
In the cooperative stage (2004‒2011), the eco-environmental benefits to local governments and the central government coincided. The central government strengthened the cooperative game between governments through the establishment of an institutional restraint mechanism and began to form a “vertical-horizontal” institutional model structure of eco-compensation in the river basin. To maximize their overall interests, governments at all levels formulated policies and systems that would encourage tolerance and adopted cooperation strategies to balance interests and support collaboration. The cooperative game behavior of governments at all levels was mainly manifested in the holding of joint meetings, the joint establishment of organizations, the joint submission of proposals and the signing of agreements, which attempted to overcome administrative divisions and achieve coordinated management of the watershed's eco-environment.
In the coordination stage (2012‒present), competition and cooperation between local governments and the central government coexist, and coopetition is the realistic choice for the game behavior of governments. Through formal or informal consultation systems, the central government has strengthened ideology to explain the institutional configuration, weakened resistance to institutional barriers (Wang and Li, 2016), and pursued stronger cooperation amid competition. Due to the dual influences of local government protective competition and ecological civilization construction, the game between governments at all levels is a dynamic relationship of simultaneous competition and cooperation. The watershed eco-compensation system has gradually changed from a municipal-provincial government model to a municipal-provincial-central government model, creating a perfect “vertical-horizontal” model.

3.2.2 Game roles of government entities

The central government is a strong entity within the game by virtue of its political power, and local governments are weak entities, as they are seeking to protect their own interests. As governments at various levels have different socioeconomic development and eco-environmental protection objectives, they play different roles in the process of watershed eco-compensation.
Municipal governments played the role of facilitators, upscaling or downscaling to strengthen political responsibility for eco-environmental protection, but they found it difficult to balance interests. The Huangshan Municipal Government and the Hangzhou Municipal Government expressed their interests and engaged in game strategy in the form of interest groups, which strengthened overall coordination of watershed eco-compensation and regulated the use and management of eco-compensation funds in the river basin. From 2010 to 2017, Huangshan encouraged private capital to participate in eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin, investing 12.1 billion yuan to protect and restore the eco-environment of the watershed (Table 2). Due to the rigid constraints of administrative boundaries, interests in the Xin'an River Basin have been divided into different local interests, and municipal governments have a non-cooperative attitude towards environmental public interests, making it difficult to maximize the comprehensive benefits of watershed eco-compensation by relying solely on mutual consultation (Yuan et al., 2016). The central government and provincial governments have thus been needed to promote eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin.
Table 2 The use of eco-compensation funds from Huangshan from 2010 to 2017
Category Number of
projects		 Project investment
(million yuan)		 Completed investment
(million yuan)		 Pilot funding
(million yuan)
Rural non-point source pollution control 110 3396.29 661.33 478.46
Industrial point source pollution control 18 7841.50 2512.10 1367.47
Urban sewage and waste treatment 43 1455.14 520.10 388.79
Ecological remediation 36 16175.24 8307.26 1277.76
Environmental protection capacity building 18 133.26 65.95 68.30
Total 225 29001.43 12066.74 3580.78

Note: Data is from the Ecological Construction and Protection Bureau of the Xin'an River Basin in Huangshan.

Provincial governments played the role of coordinators, upscaling in a bid to get the central government to intervene so as to overcome the difficulties inherent in a trans-provincial watershed eco-compensation scheme. The Anhui Provincial Government and the Zhejiang Provincial Government are responsible for vertical and horizontal allocations of local administrative power. They are also responsible for the protection of the environment and ecological security of the Xin'an River Basin, and they employed different game strategies to form a community of interests in order to develop watershed eco-compensation. As a result of provincial administrative divisions, the functions and behavior of provincial governments rigidly constrained the socioeconomic development of the Xin'an River Basin. The interests of the provinces of Anhui and Zhejiang were both local and regional, displaying features of opportunism and protectionism, making it difficult to achieve a balance of interests through their own evolution.
The central government played the role of coordinator, downscaling to incentivize and constrain coexistence using policy mechanisms as well as to promote watershed eco-compensation. Proceeding from overall interests, the central government coordinated the powers of local governments at all levels, altered the watershed eco-compensation system and promoted the sustainable development of the Xin'an River Basin. The central government formulated rules and procedures that reflect local governments' interests. As the coordinator, it guided the construction of eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin (Wang et al., 2020), using downscaling measures, such as the decentralization of powers and preferential policies, to encourage local governments to enter a kind of “promotion-based championship” based on improving the eco-environment (Zhou, 2007), and it continuously promotes the construction of eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin.

3.2.3 Game relations of government entities

Watershed eco-compensation requires incentive and restraint mechanisms, and the formation and development of the watershed eco-compensation scheme is the result of the combined effect of formal and informal restraints. There are borderless and lagging elements to the eco-environmental management of the Xin'an River Basin by local governments, which required the central government to issue the ‘Xin'an River Basin Water Environment Compensation Pilot Implementation Plan' and the ‘Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Establishment of a Horizontal Ecological Protection Compensation Mechanism in the Upper and Lower Reaches of the River Basin', among other policies to establish a formal constraint framework for eco-compensation, which provide institutional guarantees for the development of eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin. Government entities use various eco-environmental policy tools to formulate eco-compensation policies and bilateral or multilateral negotiations to build an institutional model that combines formal and informal constraints, so as to overcome barriers in the eco-compensation management system and reduce the transaction cost of coordinated governance of the watershed's eco-environment.
The existence of informal constraints reduces the implementation costs of formal constraints and consolidates implementation effects of watershed eco-compensation. Government entities have used informal constraints such as moral constraints, taboos and codes of conduct to enhance the public's eco-environmental literacy and ecological behavior. Experts and scholars have interpreted eco-compensation information relating to the Xin'an River Basin (Figure 4), helping to clarify the eco-compensation responsibilities and obligations of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces, strengthen the ecological moral constraints of the whole of society and promote the institutionalization of eco-compensation in the watershed. Chinese media, such as People's Daily, Economic Daily and CCTV, have focused on the practice of eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin, enhancing the public's awareness of it and guiding the public to become direct participants in it. Public recognition is manifested as an influence of informal constraints, which can form a feedback mechanism for the public to perform eco-compensation responsibilities for governments and enterprises and make up for the difficulties of implementing eco-compensation posed by formal constraints. According to the survey, 86.97% of residents are concerned about water resources and the eco-environment of the Xin'an River Basin, and 73.39% of residents participated in developing the eco-compensation project in the Xin'an River Basin,( The author conducted research in the Xin'an River Basin between July 7 and 16, 2018. A total of 2,334 questionnaires were distributed, and 2,217 (94.99%) valid questionnaires were returned.) willingly applying ecological ethics to constrain and regulate their own behavior.
Figure 4 Number of academic articles and newspaper reports on eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin 2006‒2018
It is difficult to completely adjust the game strategy of a government entity, as the watershed eco-compensation system has considerable institutional “stickiness”. As a developing system, the watershed eco-compensation system is in a dynamic process of continuous development and improvement. Local governments implement top-down decision-making and rely on traditional economic development methods, which creates a non-cooperative eco- environment governance pattern, though the inherent contradictions of the watershed eco- compensation system are not yet fully apparent. Under the existing financial structure, funds for eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin mainly come from central eco-compensation funding, so there is obvious path dependence. As the institutional environment changed from a “vertical” watershed eco-compensation system to a “vertical-horizontal” system there was constant conflict between government entities, with obvious features of institutional stickiness. The change in eco-compensation model in the river basin not only reflected national policy (Shi, 2019), but also the result of the game between government entities at different levels.
Government entities reduced institutional stickiness through institutional arrangements and innovations, which reshaped the watershed eco-compensation system and promoted its healthy operation. Policy innovations were the operating standards in the game involving government entities. The government entities at various levels agreed to adopt the ‘Implementation Plan for the Xin'an River Basin Water Environment Compensation Pilot,' the ‘Joint Monitoring Implementation Plan for the Xin'an River Basin Water Environment Compensation Pilot' and the ‘Agreement on Horizontal Eco-Compensation in the Upper and Lower Reaches of the Xin'an River Basin', along with other agreements and policy systems, which overcame the path dependence of the original institutional arrangements and reshaped the watershed eco-compensation system. Rule of law is also an effective means of promoting regional governance (Zhao, 2014). In 2018, the concept of an ecological civilization was written into China's constitution, which provides constitutional protection for eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin and has promoted the legislation of watershed eco-compensation. A reduction in institutional stickiness not only requires policy innovations by governments at all levels but also extensive participation by social forces. The ‘Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Improving the Compensation Mechanism for Ecological Conservation' clearly stated the basic principle of “government-led and social participation,” which means that residents' ecological protection rights and interests are guaranteed.

3.3 Eco-compensation game mechanisms of government entities in the Xin'an River Basin

3.3.1 Scalar jumping by government entities

Faced with the obstacle of a local government game of interests, appropriate intervention by the central government can overcome the constraints of administrative divisions and encourage governments at all levels to form a community of interests. Scalar jumping by a government entity is the key to promoting watershed eco-compensation. The central government and local governments have a vertical nested spatial structure. The essence of the game of interests between the two parties is the distribution and redistribution of economic, social and ecological benefits (Pan, 2017). The central government has the right to formulate and organize watershed eco-compensation policies. Through downscaling, it provides new institutional space for local governments to seek the integrity, unification and maximization of overall interests and to achieve institutional reshaping of local governments. Local governments are the most dynamic government innovation spaces. They use upscaling to feed back the evolution of watershed eco-compensation to the central government, thereby breaking path dependence on original institutional arrangements and balancing the interests of local governments and the central government. Under the existing administrative management system, government entities use formal or informal institutional constraints to create a community of ecological, social and economic interests, which conforms to each of their respective value orientations and interest demands. This has been the key to evolving the watershed eco-compensation scheme.

3.3.2 Redistributing power and capital

Government entities can redistribute power and capital through consultation, negotiation and cooperation to jointly overcome institutional stickiness, form a joint force for watershed eco-compensation and improve the eco-compensation system. The administrative hierarchy is a typical scale structure that directly reflects adjustments to administrative authority (Ma and Li, 2017). The differing economic development levels of administrative regions in the watershed created a heterogenous environment for eco-compensation. Implementing ecocompensation in the river basin was affected by existing power and capital structures of local governments. Adjustments to administrative divisions and capital redistribution relied on the formal and informal constraints of the central government. The central government devolved some power and capital to local governments (Figure 5), which gave local governments and the central government the opportunity to engage in a “game of interests,” weakened the constraints of the existing system on the development of eco-compensation and gave the local institutional environment unique characteristics. Local governments were the main entities for promoting watershed eco-compensation. They have equal legal and political status, and their respective benefits mainly depend on the allocations of power and capital by the central government. Local economic and social development has strong path dependence, with local governments granted decision-making powers over project approval and implementation via central government institutions (Wang et al., 2020). This led to strong localized competition strategies that could overcome administrative division barriers as well as institutional stickiness in coordinated governance of the eco-environment.

3.3.3 Embedding informal constraints

With the increasing participation of news media, experts, scholars and the public in watershed eco-compensation, it has shifted from a “strong state-weak society” structural model to a “strong state-strong society” one, creating a coordinated governance model for the watershed eco-environment. Government entities integrated interests through “government leadership, social coordination and multi-party participation.” This resulted in cross-regional flows of resources and the redistribution of interests, overcoming path dependence in the course of changes to the watershed eco-compensation system and forming a policy environment conducive to being innovative with the eco-compensation scheme. The news media, experts and scholars, and the public have remained interested in eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin, which has had a promotional effect, helping watershed eco-compensation to become increasingly institutionalized and standardized.
Government entities utilized the information collection and distribution advantages of the Internet to break free of traditional power structures (Zhang, 2014). This allowed them to create an atmosphere conducive to the whole of society engaging in joint protection of the environment in the Xin'an River Basin, and it created a butterfly effect of online public opinion and a power restraint mechanism. In the era of rapid informatization, government entities at all levels should strengthen their efforts to guide public opinion online and embed informal constraints to improve their implementation of watershed eco-compensation.
Figure 5 Game mechanisms of government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin

4 Conclusions and discussion

4.1 Conclusions

This study introduced the concept of institutional stickiness to the theory of politics of scale to analyze the game features and mechanisms of government entities in relation to eco- compensation in the Xin'an River Basin. The main conclusions are as follows:
(1) Different government entities, such as the central, provincial and municipal governments, experienced three stages of game strategy: competition, cooperation and “coopetition”. The establishment of a community of government interests can promote the development of watershed eco-compensation, but appropriate intervention by the central government was the key to carrying out inter-provincial eco-compensation. During the loose stage (1998‒2003), cooperative stage (2004‒2011) and coordination stage (2012‒present) of eco-compensation development in the Xin'an River Basin, government entities successively engaged in competitive, cooperative and “coopetive” game strategies in order to maximize their own interests. In the competition and cooperation game stages, the watershed eco- compensation system gradually changed from a “vertical” model to a “vertical-horizontal” model. Governments at all levels used upscaling or downscaling to promote eco-compensation. The central government was the strongest entity by virtue of its political power, and local governments were in a weak position as they sought to protect their own interests.
(2) There was obvious institutional stickiness in the transition from a “vertical” structural model to a “vertical-horizontal” model of watershed eco-compensation. Government entities used policy innovations and social participation to limit and reduce institutional stickiness and reshape the watershed eco-compensation system. Government entities at different levels, including the central, provincial and municipal governments, formulated eco-compensation policies, built an institutional model that combined formal and informal constraints, innovated with the watershed eco-compensation system and consolidated eco-compensation results. As the institutional environment changed, the watershed eco-compensation system gradually shifted from a “vertical” to a “vertical-horizontal” model, and conflict between government entities became more prominent, with obvious features of institutional stickiness. Policy innovations are the operating standards in the game involving government entities. And government entities can use institutional arrangements, institutional innovations and social participation to reduce institutional stickiness and reshape and develop the watershed eco-compensation system.
(3) Scalar jumping was a core mechanism for promoting eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin. Government entities shaped the discourse on watershed eco-compensation by redistributing power and capital and embedding informal constraints, which promoted a shift in eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from a “strong state-weak society” model to a “strong state-strong society” model. Due to restrictions created by administrative divisions, the upper and lower reaches of the river basin lacked a unified framework for natural resource use and eco-environmental management, making it difficult to implement an eco-compensation system spontaneously. Government entities used upscaling and downscaling to pursue their interests, promote changes in power relations and responsibilities, and build a mutually sustaining method of distributing benefits. Government entities overcame the constraints of the existing administrative system by redistributing power and capital and embedding informal constraints, which gave local governments and the central government the opportunity to engage in a “game of interests” and create space for developing the eco-compensation system. The eco-compensation scheme changed from a “strong state-weak society” structural model to a “strong state-strong society” one, and it achieved multi-entity cooperative governance featuring “government leadership, social coordination and multi-party participation.”

4.2 Discussion

Scale is a core concept in human geography that describes the proportions and level of space as well as the interrelationship between them. Following the “scalar turn” in Western human geography, scale has been seen as a product of social construction (Liu and Wang, 2011a), and people's understanding of scale has changed from realist to constructivist, which has led to various studies on rescaling and the politics of scale. The politics of scale affirms the social construction of scale, focusing on political games and power struggles of different stakeholders. It has become an epistemology and methodology for solving practical problems (Zhang et al., 2017). Research on politics of scale based on a combination of scale and space not only accords with the “spatial turn” in sociology, but also with the “social turn” in geography. It can provide new tools for practical applications of geography and provide a point of convergence for geography, sociology, economics and other disciplines (Liu and Wang, 2011b).
Politics of scale is widely used in research on macro sociopolitical behavior, micro social movements and power struggles, and it has become a relatively complete theoretical system with practical foundations. Applying politics of scale to research on game strategies in government-led eco-compensation has furthered our understanding of interactive games and spatial connections between government entities. It has also revealed the crux of conflicts of interest between government entities, providing a new perspective for studying watershed eco-compensation and enriching practical applications of scale theory.
As an important means of restoring and protecting the ecological systems of watersheds as well as ensuring the sustainable use of the eco-environment and river basin resources, eco-compensation greatly facilitates economic development, social progress and ecological balance in watersheds. China's current watershed eco-compensation system is dominated by government transfer payments. The development of watershed eco-compensation is the result of a mutual game between government entities, with each entity constantly adjusting its game strategy during the game process to form new behavioral norms and game rules.
This study only researched the game features and mechanisms of government entities. Future studies could look at the behavior selection and game strategy of governments, enterprises, social organizations, members of the public and other stakeholders as well as the dynamic evolution of behavioral interaction mechanisms between stakeholders and their influencing factors, in order to provide theoretical guidance for developing a long-term watershed eco-compensation mechanism.

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