Urbanization occurs when a population shifts in concentration from rural areas to cities (towns), thereby causing the non-agriculturalization of industrial-employment structures and a series of other institutional changes (Zhang et al., 2004). In the 30 years since China’s reform and opening up, a rapid urbanization process has been sustained (Cao and Liu, 2011), which has attracted widespread concern of scholars from different disciplines, and personalities from all walks of life (Chen et al., 2009; Jian and Huang, 2010; Li et al., 2012).

Both China and foreign countries have done much in-depth research on urbanization, primarily in the theoretical and empirical aspects: (1) Theoretical research. Theories for urbanization research have sought chiefly to explain and predict population migration. The theories with the greatest impact to date are Ravenstien’s ‘push-pull theory’ (An, 2004), Schults’ ‘population migration theory’ (Yao and Xu, 2008), Todaro’s ‘rural-urban population migration theory’ (Gao and Ji, 1995), Lewis’ ‘dual-sector model of economic growth’ (Sun, 1999), and finally, Lipton’s ‘urban bias theory’ (Wang and Chen, 2006). Although these theories express their own particular perspective, they all share the core idea that a shift in population concentration from rural to urban areas constitutes urbanization. The key difference between theories is that while some are optimistic others are pessimistic. For example, Lewis believes that the development of urbanization will gradually drive the whole country to achieve modernization, whereas Lipton believes that excessive pursuit of urbanization will lead to an urban bias, a critical driver of persistent poverty in developing countries. In addition, there are famous ideas proposed specifically for urbanization research, such as Northam’s ‘S-shaped curve’ (Chen et al., 2011) and Chenery’s ‘model for urbanization and industrialization’ (Chen et al., 2013). Collectively, this body of theory has provided a strong theoretical foundation for future empirical research on urbanization.

(2) Empirical research. Chen Mingxing has reviewed and summarized this field in detail (Chen, 2015). He argues that foreign empirical research on urbanization has focused mainly on five subject areas in the context of globalization and information technology trends (Robin, 2004); these are on the evaluation systems and dynamic monitoring of levels of urbanization development (Chen et al., 2014); on the classification and selection of models for urbanization development at the national (regional) level (Rob and Talukder, 2012; Seto and Satterthwaite, 2010); on the interaction among urbanization, resources, and the environment in addition to the sustainable development of typical city clusters (Seto et al., 2010) and their urbanization quality (Diener and Suh, 1997; Shafer et al., 2000). Domestic empirical research on urbanization has focused on a scientific understanding of, and speculation upon, the rational urbanization process with Chinese characteristics (Lu et al., 2007; Yao et al., 2012); on the relationship between urbanization and economic growth (Chen et al., 2013); on the spatial form, pattern, and regional model of urbanization (Xu and Yeh, 1986; Gu et al., 2008; Zhang, 2002); on the relationship between urbanization and bearing capacity of environmental resources (Bao, 2014; Liu et al., 2014); on the urban scale structure and the integration of urban and rural development (Yan et al., 2004) linked to several other issues (e.g., adjustment and management of urbanization and administrative divisions) (Zhang and Fan, 2002); on behaviors of urban and rural residents (Shen and Chai, 2013); and finally, on dynamic systems of urbanization (Chen and Cai, 2004). Evidently, the research on urbanization is relatively mature. Nevertheless, most empirical research consists of quantitative and qualitative analyses from the perspective of history and the status quo. In contrast, there has been far less predictive research carried out on urbanization.

In 2014 the central government announced the National New Urbanization Plan (2014-2020). This marks a major transformation of China’s urbanization policy, in that it aims at, for an urbanization rate of permanent residents, reaching roughly 60% by 2020. In addition, according to statistical analyses by the government and related research institutes, under the sustainable development and continued modernization of China’s economy, the period from 2010 to 2030 will undergo accelerated development of urbanization. By 2030, the Chinese population will reach approximately 1.445 billion and its urbanization rate will reach 70%. By that time, the population living in cities and towns will be over 1 billion. (UNDP, 2013; Yang, 2014)This means that China’s rural population will have been reduced by more than one-third, as more than 300 million people move to cities (towns) from the countryside. In theory, 70% is an important threshold in the development of the urbanization rate and urbanization will then also undergo a transformation from the stage of rapid advancement to that of stable development.

However, during the next 15 years of rapid urbanization, differences in regional development will persist. Specifically, the large population of farmers numbering over 300 million will not be distributed evenly after moving to cities (towns). Moreover, regional urbanization rates will vary widely and differ from 70%; such differences are expected to bring with them many problems, including those concerning the urban environment, employment, housing, pension, social welfare, medical security, and education (Cai, 2007). Some scholars even worry that these problems may lead to the emergence in China of a Latin American-style “urbanization trap” (Tian, 2006; Zheng, 2011; Liu, 2015), which has two main characteristics: first, the urban population grows excessively while the rural population hardly grows at all; second, the level of urbanization significantly exceeds the pace of industrialization and economic development. In this scenario, the following specific issues often arise: (1) Serious housing issues. The slum phenomenon is relatively common. (2) Prominent employment issues. Urban job creation opportunities and capacity are very limited, so the labor force transferred from rural areas has to flow to informal sectors. (3) The coverage provided by the social security system cannot keep up with urbanization, so a huge gap appears between what the system supplies versus what over-urbanization demands, in that the vast majority of working-age population already do not have social security. (4) Pauperization is increasingly prevalent and the incidence of poverty remains high. (5) Polarization is very obvious and an unfair distribution in wealth is very serious. (6) The society is at risk of falling into chaos and the crime rate remains high, becoming a chronic ill of the community. Therefore, Latin American-style “over-urbanization” is, in effect, one form of unsustainable development (Zheng, 2011).

China’s “semi-urbanization” refers to an incomplete urbanization process where agricultural migrants (chiefly migrant workers) are not fully integrated into modern cities and these people are still in limbo. Although they have managed to move to cities and achieved career transitions, they only “ought to be” citizens without “actual” civil rights. Thus “semi-urbanization” represents only the urbanization of the land rather than the urbanization of the human. As such, it is an immature state in the urbanization process. The general characteristics of “semi-urbanization” are as follows: “working in the city, but with a household registered in the countryside; the labor force concentrated in the city whereas family members are in the countryside; getting earnings in the city while saving them in the countryside; living in the city while based in the countryside”. Specific related issues of concern include the following: 1) Economically, migrant workers lack a permanent urban residence, and so they are rarely covered by the “five insurances and one fund”. This generates inequalities between migrant workers and urban citizens, such as “different pay for same job, different hours for same work, and different rights for the same work”, to name several. 2) Politically, the dual household registration system of urban and rural areas leaves migrant workers without the right to vote or to stand for election, and bars them from other political rights in the city. 3) Regarding welfare treatment, the special household registration system means that migrant workers who are part of the urban population but without a permanent urban residence cannot enjoy the same benefits of urban residents in terms of employment, social security, medical care, schooling, housing, and other aspects. 4) The special social environment has changed the migrant workers into a special social group “neither able to go back to the countryside nor able to integrate with the city”. Therefore, China’s “semi-urbanization” is, in effect, also another form of unsustainable development (Jiao, 2015; Li, 2013).

As seen from the analysis of Latin American-style “urbanization” and China’s “semi- urbanization”, the development paths of each are undesirable. During urbanization it is necessary to prevent the Latin American-style “over-urbanization” yet also avoid “semi-urbanization” outcomes. In order to resolve the “semi-urbanization” issues and achieve sustainable development, the best way forward is for China to adopt the new-type urbanization, which is in line with its national conditions and keeps pace with the level of industrialization.

In this context, predictive research on China’s future urbanization is especially important, as it will scientifically project this development with important practical significance for a macro-understanding of urbanization. Some scholars and teams have carried out relevant predictive research on future urbanization. For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit China Research Team has projected for the 2030 the urbanization rates of provinces, municipalities, and regions, albeit using relatively simple predictors (The EIU China Research Team, 2014).

The investment in “troika” (investment, consumption and export) has always been the main instrument in China’s economic development, and the construction of new-type urbanization is no exception because it is a huge and complex strategic project that is very costly. If there is not enough money guaranteed, the quality and efficiency of urbanization will be greatly reduced. More importantly, the huge amount of money required by such new-type urbanization and its spatial pattern of demand are not the only major strategic and practical issues that must be faced in China’s future development of new urbanization. The concerns of scholars of human geography and economic geography should also be considered. So far, however, no analysis has tried to predict what funds are required in the future urbanization of China and its provinces, municipalities, and regions.

In summary, this paper conducted predictive research on China’s new-type urbanization development and investment between 2015 and 2030. It did so by addressing the following questions: 1) What are the temporal and spatial differences between China’s provincial urbanization rates? 2) Over time, how do those factors change which are closely related to urbanization development (i.e., urbanization quality, population reproduced by the city or town itself, urban population transferred from rural areas, GDP development, and the three major industrial structures)? 3) Is the urbanization rate of provinces, municipalities, and regions compatible with social and economic development? 4) How much funding is required for urbanization development at the provincial level? This research not only has important historical and theoretical significance but also offers great practical significance for a better macro-understanding of China’s future urbanization development.

At the core of new-type urbanization is the urbanization of people through the citizenization of migrant workers. Funds required to do this include those for necessary education, medical treatment, housing, social security, and infrastructure.

Some scholars and groups have predicted the funds required for China’s new-type urbanization development. Since 2006, six institutions-Chinese Academy of Sciences, the former Ministry of Construction, China Development Research Foundation, Development Research Center of the State Council, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and China Development Bank - have estimated the cost of urbanization and the per capita cost of citizen-ization of migrant workers to range from 20 000 yuan to 130 000 yuan (RGSCDRC, 2011; Ma, 2013; MHURC, PRC, 2014). Until 2030, approximately 390 million farmers in China are waiting for citizenization and the per capita public cost is approximately 131,000 yuan; so the total public cost required alone by citizenization will reach 51 trillion yuan (Pan and Wei, 2013), and more funds will be required if other associated costs, such as infrastructure construction, are considered. Gu Shengzu believes that in the next 10 years, the urbanization of nearly 400 million people will require an increase investment demand of 40 trillion yuan, if calculated by the fixed asset investment standard of 100 000 yuan per capita (Gu et al., 2014). Shi believes that a staggering 56 trillion yuan should have been invested in urbanization by 2030 (Shi, 2013). Vice Minister Wang Baoan of the Ministry of Finance, said that urbanization rate was expected to reach 60% in 2020, which would result in an investment demand of approximately 42 trillion yuan (Chen, 2014). According to the estimates from China Development Bank, China’s urbanization will require investment and financing funds of 25 trillion yuan in the next 3 years, with an average of more than 8 trillion yuan per year, thus accounting for nearly 20% of the annual national investment in fixed assets of nearly 40 trillion yuan. Until 2020, China must invest at least 50 trillion yuan more in urban construction (Ma, 2014). An additional investment in urban fixed assets of nearly 6 trillion yuan is needed for every 1% increase in China’s urbanization rate. It is also estimated that China’s urbanization rate will reach about 60% in 2020, while its urban population will reach about 850 million; for this, an additional investment in urban fixed assets of approximately 38 trillion yuan is required. Meanwhile, more than 200 million migrant workers included in the current urban population and their accompanying families lack basic public services available to urban residents; so an additional payment of 10 trillion yuan is required based on an average public service cost of 50 000 yuan per capita. Thus, China’s urbanization process will require a total of almost 50 trillion yuan, with an annual average of over 7 trillion yuan, equivalent to 60% of the national revenue in 2012 (SC, 2014; Yang and Shi, 2014).

The National New Urbanization Plan (2014-2020) anticipates the urbanization rate of the resident population to reach 60% in 2020, and the urbanization rate of the household-registered population to reach 45%, thus enabling approximately 100 million migrant workers and other resident population members to settle in urban areas (RGSCDRC, 2011). According their predictions, the urbanization rate will reach 60.40% in 2023, which will require an investment of 50 trillion yuan. If calculated using a conservative annual investment of 8 trillion yuan, an additional investment of at least 56 trillion yuan is needed when urbanization rate reaches 70.12% in 2030. Taken together, a total of 105.38 trillion yuan is required for China’s urbanization construction between 2015 and 2030; this total is equivalent to the projected national GDP in 2022 (105.98 trillion yuan). Hence, China must make wise strategic preparations in its thinking and planning, theories, policy, funds, and talents to promote and implement the new-type urbanization successfully (MHURC, PRC, 2014).

Authorities and experts predict that 400 million farmers will have become citizens by 2030 (Yu, 2009). In fact, not all these people are farmers, as some will have come from the urban area population. Our calculation results indicate that the urban population will increase by 385.8422 million from 2015 to 2030, which includes 315.6796 million people emigrating from rural areas and 70.1626 million born in already urban areas.

Though there are differences in the cost during urbanization among countries, provinces, cities, and counties, the urbanization qualitative object is the same. Therefore, we use the same standard to calculate the cost for each. Using this net increase in the urban populations between 2015 and 2030, we were able to work out the changes in the provincial, municipal, and regional population sizes and the investment funds required for the construction of new-type urbanization when the national urbanization rate has reached 70.12% in 2030 (Table 4).

Table 4 summarizes the spatial distribution of the Chinese population in 2030 and that of urban areas, urban population transferred from rural areas, population to be urbanized, funds needed for new urbanization construction, total GDP, and other factors.

Between 2015 and 2030, only Guangdong’s population to be urbanized exceeds 30 million (up to 63.0646 million); for Jiangsu, Shandong, and Zhejiang, the population to be urbanized is between 20 and 30 million; for Henan, Hebei, Sichuan, Hunan, Fujian, Anhui, Shanxi, Hubei, Shanghai, Beijing, Yunnan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, the population to be urbanized is between 10 and 20 million; for Liaoning, Shaanxi, Chongqing, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Tianjin, and Heilongjiang, the population to be urbanized is between 5 and 10 million; for Gansu, Jilin, Xinjiang, and Hainan, the population to be urbanized is between 3 and 5 million; for Ningxia and Qinghai, the population to be urbanized is between 1 and 3 million; the lowest population to be urbanized is that of Tibet at 437 600 (Table 4).

Between 2015 and 2030, only Guangdong’s urban population transferred from rural areas exceeds 30 million (up to 53.8101 million); for Jiangsu, Shandong, and Zhejiang, the urban population transferred from rural areas is between 20 and 30 million; for Henan, Hebei, Sichuan, Hunan, Fujian, Anhui, and Shanxi, the urban population transfer is between 10 and 20 million; for Shanghai, Yunnan, Beijing, Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Liaoning, Chongqing, and Guizhou, the urban population transfer is between 5 and 10 million; for Inner Mongolia, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Jilin, and Xinjiang, the urban population transfer is between 3 and 5 million; for Hainan, Ningxia, and Qinghai the urban population transfer is between 1 and 3 million; finally, Tibet has the lowest urban population transferred from rural areas, at 359,300 (Table 4).

Between 2015 and 2030, only Guangdong’s funds for new urbanization construction exceeds 10 trillion yuan (up to 17.17 trillion yuan); for Jiangsu, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Henan, the funds required are between 5 and 10 trillion yuan; for Hebei, Sichuan, and Hunan, the funds required are between 4 and 5 trillion yuan; for Fujian, Anhui, Shanxi, Hubei, Shanghai, Beijing, and Yunnan, the funds required are between 3 and 4 trillion yuan; for Jiangxi, Guangxi, Liaoning, Shaanxi, and Chongqing, the funds required are between 2 and 3 trillion yuan; for Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Jilin, and Xinjiang, the funds required are between 1 and 2 trillion yuan; for Hainan, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Tibet, the funds required are less than 1 trillion yuan (Tibet needs the least funds, at 120 billion yuan; Table 4).

Between 2015 and 2030, only for Guangdong did the funds required for new urbanization construction account for over 10% of the national funds required (up to 16.29%); for Jiangsu, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Henan, the funds account for 5% to 10%; for Hebei and Sichuan, the funds account for 4% to 5%; for Hunan, Fujian, Anhui, Shanxi, and Hubei, the funds account for 3% to 4%; for Shanghai, Beijing, Yunnan, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Liaoning, and Shaanxi, the funds account for 2% to 3%; for Chongqing, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Jilin, and Xinjiang, the funds account for 1% to 2%; for Hainan, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Tibet, the funds account for below 1% (Tibet accounts for the least proportion, at only 0.11%; Table 4).

Between 2015 and 2030, when considered as a percentage of GDP, only for Guangdong and Yunnan do the funds required for new urbanization account for over 10%; for Shanxi and Guizhou, the funds account for 9% to 10% of GDP; for Hainan, Jiangxi, Gansu, Anhui, Guangxi, and Ningxia, the funds account for 7% to 9% of GDP; for Fujian, Zhejiang, Hebei, Henan, Sichuan, Qinghai, Hunan, Tibet, and Chongqing, the funds for 6% to 7% of GDP; for Shaanxi, Beijing, and Xinjiang, the funds account for 5% to 6% of GDP; for Shandong, Shanghai, Hubei, Tianjin, and Jiangsu, the funds account for 4% to 5%; for Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin, and Inner Mongolia, the funds account for 3% to 4% of GDP (Inner Mongolia, not Tibet, accounts for the least at 3.47%; Table 4).

In summary, between 2015 and 2030, owing to the stark demographic differences presented in Table 4, stark spatial differences ensue in the funds required by the provinces, municipalities, and regions for new-type urbanization construction. such differences are huge for each province, municipality or region regardless of the size of the differences.

Currently, however, national investment in urbanization construction remains very limited. Of the national investment in fixed assets for the construction of urban public facilities, the proportions of the cumulative amount of each investment, out of the total investment, between 2001 and 2013 were as follows: the central financial allocations accounted for 1.71%, local financial allocations accounted for 27.59%, domestic bank loans accounted for 34.72%, bonds accounted for 0.51%, foreign direct investment accounted for 1.69%, self-raised funds accounted for 28.54%, and other funds accounted for 5.24%. The national investment in fixed assets for the construction of urban public facilities in 2013 totaled 1.63498 trillion yuan, among which the central financial allocations accounted for less than 1.71% (MHURC, PRC, 2014). The state should not rely solely on provincial, municipal, and regional construction during the promotion of new-type urbanization. Some provinces and regions have difficulty in promoting new urbanization, so the state must give them some financial support. The next 15 years heralds the golden age of China’s new-type urbanization development. We suggest that the state should make rational allocations of investment intensity into new urbanization, and that it treat investment in provinces, municipalities, and regions differently and contextually according to objectively derived circumstances.

A quantitative description is given below based on the investment intensity index model of China’s new-type urbanization construction.

where δ is the investment intensity index of China’s new urbanization construction; GDP_lji is the total GDP of provinces, municipalities, and regions between 2015 and 2030; M_ci is the total funds required for provincial, municipal, and regional new urbanization construction between 2015 and 2030; P_i is the total population of provinces, municipalities, and regions in 2030; GDP_ljn is the total national GDP between 2015 and 2030; M_cn is the total funds required for national new urbanization construction; and P_n is the total population of China in 2030. Equation (10) shows that the funds for new urbanization construction are less available when δ is higher, thus indicating that financial support should be increased. Conversely, when δ is lower, funds are more available, and thus financial support should be reduced (Table 5).

According to the results shown in Table 5, the 31 provinces, municipalities, and regions could be divided into six categories or levels ranked in descending order of their investment intensity for China’s new-type urbanization construction. Level A represents the highest level whereas level F represents the lowest level. 1) Level A, δ>0.4, includes four provinces and regions, namely Guizhou, Tibet, Yunnan, and Gansu; 2) Level B, 0.4>δ>0.3, includes three provinces and regions, namely Shanxi, Xinjiang, and Guangxi; 3) Level C, 0.3>δ>0.1, includes eight provinces and regions, namely Jiangxi, Anhui, Qinghai, Henan, Sichuan, Ningxia, Hainan, and Hebei; 4) Level D, 0.1>δ>0.0, includes four provinces, namely Hunan, Heilongjiang, Guangdong, and Shaanxi; 5) Level E, 0.0>δ>-0.5, includes seven provinces and municipalities, namely Hubei, Chongqing, Jilin, Fujian, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Liaoning; and finally, 6) Level F, δ<-0.5, includes five provinces, municipalities and regions, namely Beijing, Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia, Tianjin, and Shanghai.

The above division reveals the national investment in provincial, municipal, and regional new urbanization construction in the next 15 years. Moreover, it also suggests the way for provinces, municipalities, and regions to select a new-type urbanization construction investment and financing model that is in line with their conditions and within the scope of national conditions as well. This research exercise thus provides a scientific basis for new urbanization path which is in line with national conditions or their own regional conditions more specifically.

(1) China’s population will grow to 1.445 billion and its urbanization rate will reach 70.12% between 2015 and 2030. Authorities and experts predict that China’s population will see negative growth around 2030 (Yu, 2009; Liu and Li, 2013). By this time, the age structure, sex ratio, occupational structure, urban-rural structure, spatial distribution structure, and other patterns of the population will have changed dramatically. Consequently, the demographic dividend will gradually disappear, and China will come under greatest pressure from the total population size. This marks a key turning point in the development of China’s population and is an important factor restricting China’s transition from a moderately developed country to a fully developed country.

Based on the international research of urbanization development (Chen, 2012; Shang, 2013), urbanization development is rapid when the urbanization rate is between 30% and 70%, but it will gradually slow down when the urbanization rate exceeds 70%. In theory, then, the period around 2030 will be a turning point in China’s urbanization development, as urbanization development will slow down. However, the estimate of 70% may not represent the true urbanization rate that will manifest, and thus social, economic, ecological, and other problems may persist in some form. All levels of government, from the central to local, should attach great importance to the coordinated development of urbanization and tackling various issues in the future development of China.

(2) From the perspective of the special and temporal differentiation rule in China’s development, the urbanization rate will increase to 70.12% from 48.23% between 2015 and 2030. In this context, some experts and scholars posit that approximately 400 million rural people need to be urbanized before 2030. This view is only put forward according to the temporal difference laws in the development of urbanization rate. In fact, the increase in the urbanization rate, and thus the urban population, is not simply a transferral of the rural population migrating into the urban population, because it also includes the reproduction within the urban population. In view of this, the calculation results of this paper indicate that the urban population will reproduce 70.1626 million people, and that 315.6796 million rural residents are to be urbanized between 2015 and 2030. The process of urbanization development between 2015 and 2030 is actually the growth of these two segments of the whole population. Therefore, in the future construction of new-type urbanization, strictly speaking, the urbanization cost of these two distinct parts should be calculated separately to define and refine the investment scenarios more accurately.

(3) Based on the predictions of the temporal and spatial differences in China’s urbanization rate between 2015 and 2030, clearly the development of urbanization rates of provinces, municipalities, and regions varies substantially. Nevertheless, these projected urbanization rates are increasing with great spatial differences. In 2030, with respect to urbanization rate, six provinces and municipalities are over 90%, two more are between 80% and 90%, four provinces and regions are between 70% and 80% with another 12 between 60% and 70%, 3 more are between 50% and 60%, and just four provinces and regions are between 40% and 50%, while Tibet is ranked last at 32.02%. Concerning the percentage change in the urbanization rate, five provinces and municipalities are over 30%, 16 provinces, municipalities, and regions are between 20% and 30%, eight provinces and regions are between 10% and 20%, and Tibet and Xinjiang are below 10%. Such temporal and spatial differences reveal that almost all the provinces, municipalities, and regions with an urbanization rate over 70% in 2030 are on the east coast, whereas almost all the provinces and regions with an urbanization rate below 60% are found in the northwest inland and border areas. Provinces and municipalities with changes in their urbanization rate of over 30% are mainly developed provinces, which are distributed in the eastern economic belt, whereas those provinces and regions with a percentage below 20% are mainly in the western economic belt.

The urbanization rate, and its increase in the eastern, central, and western economic belts between 2015 and 2030, reflects in part the above laws. Specifically, our analysis suggests that, in the next 15 years, the flow of China’s population and the development of the new urbanization will continue its east-west trend (particularly, as before, into the three urban city clusters).

(4) There exist significant differences in the population, natural conditions, eco-environmental quality, the historical and cultural environment, economic development level and other factors of the provinces, municipalities and regions. Thus, the differences in the development of urbanization quality of the provinces, municipalities and regions between 2015 and 2030 objectively reflect the development laws of various environmental factors, which is a normal phenomenon. What is important is to understand and reduce these variable differences to better promote the balanced development of regional urbanization quality in China. According to the four-category division of the 31 provinces, municipalities, and regions based on their urbanization quality in 2030, this present paper recommends that, for future construction of the new-type urbanization, the state should take the following measures: higher-quality provinces and municipalities should mainly rely on their own investment in construction; high-quality provinces and regions should be given some financial support; low-quality provinces and regions should receive more financial support; lower-quality provinces and regions should be the focus of financial support.

(5) We estimated that at least 105.38 trillion yuan will be required to invest in the construction of China’s new-type urbanization by 2030. Ostensibly, this is a huge “astronomical figure”. As such, the country and its provinces, municipalities, and regions should ponder on what kind of investment and financing model(s) ought to be established. The construction of new-type urbanization is comprehensive, but most important therein is the construction of urban public facilities, in which the country invests less than it could. Currently, there are many drawbacks in the investment and financing model of China’s urbanization construction that manifest as follows: the government is in a dominant position, financing is mainly bank credit-based, and the financing platform assumes the financing responsibility of local governments. Practices have proved that this investment and financing model is not sustainable. Therefore, in promoting the construction of the new-type urbanization, there must be an investment and financing model that is in line with China’s national conditions. This will serve as an important guarantee for the smooth construction of the new-type urbanization.

(6) Promoting the new-type urbanization involves two basic yet critical factors, namely people and capital. Developing people-oriented urbanization is not possible without reasonable capital investment. How should the central and local governments invest in the new urbanization construction of provinces, municipalities, and regions between 2015 and 2030? When and where to invest? How much money is appropriate? Where to get the money? Governments must conduct in-depth rigorous research on national (provincial, municipal, and regional contexts) conditions to find out more about the real situation, to provide a more detailed scientific basis, and to develop better scientific and detailed regional plans for investment in the construction of the new-type urbanization. Undoubtedly this endeavor involves much complex and systematic research, but implementing such a project is next on our agenda.

(7) Finally, the future development of China’s new-type urbanization must comply with China’s basic national conditions. Such national conditions are derived from the great temporal and spatial differences in its population, resources, environments, and economic, social, and cultural capital and development trends. Importantly, the objective laws of such differences form the basis and preconditions to promote the scientific development of new-type urbanization. Failing to clearly understand this process, or going against these laws, will likely invite a variety of problems and issues. If this is allowed to happen, it will be even more difficult to guarantee the quality and scientific development of the new-type urbanization in China through 2030.