Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale

doi:10.1007/s11442-021-1893-1

Abstract

Abstract:

China's policy on ecological compensation (eco-compensation) in watershed ecosystems is of economic, social and environmental significance for China's ecological governance and protection of natural areas. It involves balancing the interests of regional stakeholders, coordinating the development of regional environments and establishing effective cooperation models, making it a classic topic for geographical research. This study introduces the concept of institutional “stickiness” to the theory of politics of scale to analyze the features and mechanisms of the game behavior of government entities in the process of implementing watershed eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin. Our results show the following: government entities at various levels, including the central, provincial and municipal governments, experienced the three stages of game strategy of competition, cooperation and “coopetition”; building a government community of shared interests can promote watershed eco-compensation, and “appropriate intervention” by the central government is key to achieving inter-provincial watershed eco-compensation; there was clear institutional stickiness during the transition from a “vertical” model of watershed eco-compensation to a “vertical-horizontal” model, with government entities using policy innovations and social participation to limit and reduce stickiness so as to reshape the watershed eco-compensation system; scalar jumping is the core mechanism that promoted eco-compensation in the study basin, and government entities shaped the discourse on watershed eco-compensation by redistributing powers and capital and creating informal constraints, which promoted the transformation of eco-compensation from a “strong state-weak society” structural model, to a “strong state-strong society” model in the Xin'an River Basin. These results can provide theoretical support for the construction of inter-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanisms, provide a scientific basis for the rational evaluation and guidance of watershed eco-compensation practices, and promote the coordinated and sustainable socioeconomic development of watersheds.

Key words: eco-compensation, scalar jumping, institutional stickiness, game strategy, Xin'an River Basin

REN Yisheng, LU Lin, YU Hu, ZHU Daocai. Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale[J].Journal of Geographical Sciences, 2021, 31(8): 1205-1221.

Figures/Tables 7

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Table 1

Details of the Xin'an River Basin Eco-Compensation Pilot Scheme

Item	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Pilot period	2012‒2014	2015‒2017	2018‒2020
Basic principles	Prioritize protection, reasonable compensation; maintain water quality and strive for improvement; mainly local, with central supervision; monitoring for evidence to supplement and promote governance	Same as round 1	Same as round 1
Compensation model	The central government and Anhui and Zhejiang provinces set up the Xin'an River Basin Water Environment Compensation Fund	Same as round 1	Based on financial transfer payments, the Xin'an River Basin Water Environment Compensation Fund was jointly established by Anhui and Zhejiang provinces
Pilot funding	300 million yuan each year from central government and 100 million yuan each year from Anhui and Zhejiang provinces	Diminishing investment of 400 million, 300 million yuan and 200 million yuan from central government and 200 million yuan each year from Anhui and Zhejiang provinces	200 million yuan each year from Anhui and Zhejiang provinces and seek central financial support
Assessment basis	Water quality monitoring data from cross-border areas	Same as round 1	Same as round 1
Assessment index	Compensation index p calculated based on the annual averages of permanganate index, ammonia nitrogen, total phosphorus, and total nitrogen (2008‒2010) as the basic limits, with water quality stability coefficient k being 0.85.	Compensation index p calculated based on the annual averages of permanganate index, ammonia nitrogen, total phosphorus, and total nitrogen (2012‒2014) as the basic limits, with water quality stability coefficient of 0.89.	The weights of the four indicators of ammonia nitrogen, permanganate index, total nitrogen and total phosphorus were adjusted to 22%, 22%, 28%, 28%, and the water quality stability coefficient k was 0.90
Assessment method	Joint monitoring by Anhui and Zhejiang, approved by China National Environmental Monitoring Center and provided to the Ministry of Finance and the former Ministry of Environmental Protection	Same as round 1	Same as round 1
Compensation method	If p≤1, Zhejiang Province compensates Anhui Province 100 million yuan; if p>1, Anhui Province compensates Zhejiang Province 100 million yuan; the central government allocates all funds to Anhui Province	If p≤1, Zhejiang Province compensates Anhui Province 100 million yuan; if p>1, Anhui Province compensates Zhejiang Province 100 million yuan; if p≤0.95, Zhejiang Province compensates Anhui Province another 100 million yuan; the central government allocates all funds to Anhui Province	In a given year, if water quality reaches assessment standard, Zhejiang Province compensates Anhui Province 200 million yuan; if water quality does not meet assessment standard, Anhui Province compensates Zhejiang Province 200 million yuan
Use of funds	Industrial structure adjustment and industry layout optimization in river basin, protection of water environment and control of water pollution in river basin, ecological protection in river basin, etc.	Additional 100 million yuan each for Anhui and Zhejiang mainly for waste and sewage treatment in city of Huangshan, especially rural waste and sewage treatment	Encourage and support the establishment of green funds, public and private capital cooperation model, financing discounts, etc., to guide private capital to increase river basin governance and green industry investment

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Category	Number of projects	Project investment (million yuan)	Completed investment (million yuan)	Pilot funding (million yuan)
Rural non-point source pollution control	110	3396.29	661.33	478.46
Industrial point source pollution control	18	7841.50	2512.10	1367.47
Urban sewage and waste treatment	43	1455.14	520.10	388.79
Ecological remediation	36	16175.24	8307.26	1277.76
Environmental protection capacity building	18	133.26	65.95	68.30
Total	225	29001.43	12066.74	3580.78