Incorporating the Istanbul-Ankara high-speed railway into the Belt and Road Initiative: Negotiation, institutional alignment and regional development

doi:10.1007/s11442-021-1869-1

Abstract

Abstract:

This article contributes to a small but growing body of multi-sited and multi-scalar research on the Belt and Road Initiative. We focus on relations at the national, regional and international scales, and present original research from China and Turkey, to show how the Istanbul-Ankara high-speed railway has served as a testing ground for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its construction was initially funded by the European Investment Bank, but it is now part of the backbone of the Turkish Government’s Middle Corridor plan which enhances west-east connectivity and integration with the Caucasus and Central Asia. We show that in contrast to multinational corporations from the OECD that seek to remain footloose, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) seek to adapt to, apprehend and ultimately shape local institutions. In the case of Turkey this proved difficult given its institutional alignment with the European Union. Thus, while the railway project was completed successfully by a consortium led by a Chinese SOE, Turkey’s dynamic and complex regulatory environment discourages Chinese SOEs in the infrastructure sector. We conclude that the Turkish and Chinese governments are currently pursuing complementary territorial visions yet their cooperation is project-based and pragmatic.

Key words: Belt and Road Initiative, infrastructure, high speed rail, regional development, Turkey, China

Seth SCHINDLER, Mustafa Kemal BAYIRBAĞ, GAO Boyang. Incorporating the Istanbul-Ankara high-speed railway into the Belt and Road Initiative: Negotiation, institutional alignment and regional development[J].Journal of Geographical Sciences, 2021, 31(5): 747-762.

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Year	Key development/issue
1971	Diplomatic relations established
1992	Turkey-PRC Business Council established
1997	Turkey’s disillusionment with the EU’s Luxemburg Meeting
2000	Trade volume between Turkey and China surpasses $1 billion
2005	Chinese firms won the bid for Istanbul-Ankara HSR project
2010	Wen Jiabao visits Ankara and the two countries establish a strategic partnership
2012	Monetary swap agreement
2014	Istanbul-Ankara HSR in service
2015	Erdoğan visits Beijing (third meeting with Xi Jinping)
2015	MoU signed for the BRI cooperation
2017	The central component of the Middle Corridor, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway in service
2019	Monetary Swap Agreement renewed

Year	Key development
2003	The HSR Project was formulated by the Turkish government
2005	The bid was won by Chinese companies
2006	Contract signed, 1.27 billion USD
2006	The EIB disburses the first installment
2007	China Exim Bank disburses loan of 720 million USD
2008	Construction begins
2011	EIB disburses second tranche
2013	EIB disburses third tranche
2014	Project completed